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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent book defending what he sees as a narrow but vital role for the university, Stanley Fish writes that academic enterprises provide "oases of reflection amid the urgencies that press in
on us when we are being citizens, parents, politicians, soldiers,
entrepreneurs, lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc."' He argues that
"politically explosive issues" must "be made into subjects of intellectual inquiry" through "academicizing"-"detach[ing] [a topic]
from the context of its real world urgency.., and insert[ing] it into
a context of academic urgency, where there is an account to be
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Around the World, on March 18, 2008. Thank you to my co-panelists, Fr. Gregory Kalscheur, Lloyd Mayer, and Mark Scarberry, for their helpful comments,
to Bill Brewbaker, Marc DeGirolami, Rick Garnett, Kent Greenawalt, Leslie
Griffin, Dan Joyner, and Chris Lund for their comments on written drafts, to
Jennifer Michaelis for research assistance, and especially to Kelly and Samantha
Horwitz for their support and forbearance. I am grateful to the University of
Alabama School of Law for its support of this project.
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STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OwN TIME 52 (2008).
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offered or an analysis to be performed." 2 I sympathize with Fish's
account of the typical academic mission and the need to effect at
least a partial divorce of the timeless, the true subject of great academic inquiry, from the merely timely, the passing fads and passions of the day. That is all the more true in legal scholarship,
which so often sacrifices a deeper search for truth in favor of a relentlessly normative, problem-solving, transient approach.'
Yet, when legal scholars and philosophers presume to examine the subject of this Article-the proper relationship between
religion and politics-they often fall prey to a contrary, but equally
distorting, pressure. When legal scholars prescribe rules of conduct to govern the role of religion in contemporary politics, they
must not only avoid the urge to be too timely, to think in terms of
particular issues, candidates, or campaigns, but they must also
avoid the urge to be so "timeless," so Olympian and de-haut-enbas, as to render their advice impractical or absurd. Here, they fare
less well. Many a reader of the literature on this subject has noted
that writers in the field propose rules of dialogue that tend to give
off the refined vapors of the seminar room or the faculty lounge,
not the pugnacious atmosphere of our daily political dialogue.4
In this Article, I hope to thread a path through both the
timely and the timeless, by examining the eternal question of
whether and how religion should involve itself in political debate
through the words of the central actors: the political candidates
themselves. I want to move the discussion from the seminar room
to the war room, as it were, by reviewing and critiquing some of

2.
Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humani3.
ties: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 178 (2006) ("Much
legal scholarship aims to persuade other people about what legal rule or legal
interpretation to adopt. As we have noted, this follows from law's narrow version of normativity-the notion that contributions to legal scholarship are
judged in terms of how they might promote prescriptive solutions to legal problems."); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167
(1990).
4. See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, Religious Tests in the Mirror: The Constitutional Law and Constitutional Etiquette of Religion in JudicialNominations, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 136 (2006); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Religious
Claims and the Dynamics of Argument, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 423, 428
(2001).
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what our politicians have had to say about the role of religion in
American politics.
Although this discussion has gone on for so long that it
may seem timeless, time has not stood still in the development of
either American politics or American religion. Indeed, in examining the movement of political rhetoric on the relationship between
religion and public leadership, one cannot help but notice that the
rhetoric has evolved with the times. Lawrence Lessig once wrote
masterfully about "meaning's vulnerability to changes in context."5
"At the core" of the law's response to changing context, he wrote,
"is an idea of contestability." 6 Ideas can be either contested or uncontested, in the foreground or the background of public attention.7
Some issues may be the subject of public disagreement, but
"stay[ I] quite firmly in the background of social and political life." 8
Contestable issues, by contrast, are the stuff of our greatest public
controversies for as long as they remain contestable.9
So it is with the relationship between religion and American politics. Americans have always been a religious people, as
Justice Douglas famously observed.10 But to leave it at that obscures a great many changes in what it has meant to be religious in
America-changes that track, perhaps, what it means to be American, or even what it means to be religious, in a society whose pluralism and secularism unsettle the easy assumptions of earlier generations. Religious belief, which was once so widespread and so
widely shared as to be a common and uninteresting trait, has become increasingly contestable, one among many competing belief
systems and values. In turn, that development has meant that, for
those Americans who are deeply religious, religion has also become increasingly salient: it has become an ever more powerful,
noteworthy, and publicly debated phenomenon. It is thus no con5.
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in
Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1801 (1997).
6. Id. at 1802.
7.
See id. at 1804.
8.
Id.
9. See id. at 1802 (defining contestable issues as those that meet two
conditions: (1) "there is actual and substantial disagreement about it (that is, ....
it is actually contested)"; and (2) the "disagreement is in the foreground of pub-

lic life").
10. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.").
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tradiction to say that Americans are a people who have become
both more religious, in the sense that religion occupies a greater
share of their attention and passion, and less religious, in the sense
that an increasing number of Americans either profess no religion
or have shunted it,off to the side."
Any contemporary consideration of the relationship between religion and American politics must thus assume the perspective of religion in an age of contestability-an age in which,
precisely because religion is of fading importance to many people,
it is of increasing importance to others, and in which the very question of religion is subject to vigorous debate and firmly located in
the foreground of public discussion. Not surprisingly, political
strategies for dealing with the relationship between religion and
politics in American life have changed to reflect this era of religious contestability. As suggested below, in the past half-century
American political culture has witnessed a move from strategies of
avoidance, 2 in which politicians have attempted to satisfy suspicious voters by relegating religion to the background, to strategies
of dialogue, in which politicians have moved religion to the foreground as a way of reaching voters of different faiths and beliefs.
Much of the move from strategies of avoidance to strategies of dialogue is a step in the right direction. Religion belongs in
public life, and it neither can, nor should, be expunged from public
dialogue and decision-making, however messy and divisive that
dialogue may prove. 3 This is not to minimize the very real divisions and hard feelings that may result when religion enters the
public stage. But if religion truly exists in an age of contestability,
then it is unlikely that any attempt to relegate it to the background
Of course, this rather broad view elides a good deal of history. In
11.
offering a general sense of the movement of religion from an uncontestable to a
deeply contestable value, I do not mean to slight the degree to which sectarian
differences have been a source of controversy from the very beginnings of
American history; nor do I mean to ignore the fact that religiosity has expanded
and contracted in previous eras, both during and on either side of the nation's
Great Awakenings.
The phrase is taken from BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE:
12.
THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN DREAM 213 (2006) (describing
"strategies of avoidance" of religion in the public square practiced by various
politicians, particularly those of a liberal or progressive stripe, including John F.
Kennedy).
13.
For an expanded treatment of this view, see Horwitz, supra note 4.
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will succeed.' 4 Surely it is better, then, to fashion realistic rules of
engagement for religious dialogue in American public life. 5
What follows is an attempt to discern and critique what
some of the nation's leading politicians have had to say about the
relationship between religion and American politics. This Article
will focus in particular on three political figures, all of whom engaged in politics at the highest and most visible level-the quest
for the Presidency. Those figures are John F. Kennedy, Mitt Romney, and Barack Obama. Perhaps, by examining the words of
these politicians themselves, forged and tested in the crucible of
electoral politics, one may learn something about how religion and
politics relate at a level that is both muddier and more practical,
and thus, offers a sense of the best one may reasonably hope for
when religion takes the public stage. 6

14.
See, e.g., STEVEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS
AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN PoLmcs 7 (2000) ("Religion, in short, will be in
politics. It cannot reasonably be kept out."); Horwitz, supra note 4, at 135; Steven Shiffrin, Religion and Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631, 1634

(1999).
15.
See Horwitz, supra note 4.
16.
Let me offer a word about the limited scope of this Article. It is not
intended as a work of history. Instead, I have chosen to offer a close reading of
each of the central political texts I examine here, reading them afresh and
somewhat out of context. Although I have suggested that the relationship between religion and politics has changed with the times, each of these speeches
usefully addresses that relationship, and each is rewarding for its own sake and
on its own terms.
Nor is this a deeper work of philosophy and jurisprudence on the
relationship between religion and politics. For discussions along those lines, see
Richard Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J.
1667, 1718 n.317 (2006); see also CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS
CONVICTION N LIBERAL POLITICS (2002); KENT GREENAWALT, 2 RELIGION AND
THE CONSTrrUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008). Such abstract philosophical considerations of the relationship between religion and politics necessarily operate at a fairly high and general level, and the normative proposals they
offer are often abstract and provide little guidance for life on the ground. This
Article is influenced by those more abstract discussions, but attempts to operate
at a more practical level.
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H1l.JOHN F. KENNEDY: THE STRATEGY OF AVOIDANCE

The journey begins with what is surely the most famous
contemporary political discussion of the relationship between religion and American politics: John F. Kennedy's speech before the
Greater Houston Ministerial Association on September 12, 1960.
Kennedy's speech took place in a social setting that was in some
ways utterly familiar, and in some ways strikingly different from
the present. First, the speech took place in an America in which
the prevailing religious sentiment was broad but shallow. As Mark
Massa remarks, the role of religion in American public life in the
Eisenhower era was one of both "high visibility and ...

almost

contentless theology."' 7 The state of affairs was best characterized
by Eisenhower's famous statement: "Our form of government has
no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith[,] and I
don't care what it is."' 8 That remark, as Gary Scott Smith suggests,
surely was meant less to suggest that any religion would do than to
signify that "all three major American faiths-Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism-supported the moral values and spiritual
ideas on which the nation rested."' 9 As captured in Will Herberg's
classic mid-century work, Protestant- Catholic - Jew, ° the spirit

of the age was one of religious piety, 2' but of a decidedly thin
brand.22
Second, and notwithstanding the emergence of a concept of
"Judeo-Christian tradition" 23 that purported to welcome various
Christian sects, Kennedy also spoke to a nation in which antiCatholicism was not only more widespread than it is today 24 but
17.
MARK S. MASSA, CATHOLICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE: FULTON
SHEEN, DOROTHY DAY, AND THE NOTRE DAME FOOTBALL TEAM 130 (1999)
(emphasis in original).
18.
GARY ScoTr SMITH, FAITH AND THE PRESIDENCY: FROM GEORGE
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 254 (2006).

19.
20.

Id.
WILL

HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEW:
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (1955).
21.
See MASSA, supra note 17, at 130.

AN

ESSAY

IN

22.
See SMITH, supra note 18, at 255 (quoting R.W.B. Lewis, writing in
the NEW REPUBLIC in 1954 about the "thin religiosity" of the Eisenhower administration).
23.
MASSA, supra note 17, at 130.
24.
In saying so, I of course do not mean to neglect the continuing presence of anti-Catholic sentiment in America through the present day. See, e.g.,
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also far more vocal and socially acceptable.2 Those prejudices
were not simply a matter of internecine strife among the deeply
religious. Catholicism was also suspect in the eyes of many liberals and progressives of the era, as evidenced by the popularity of
Paul Blanshard's critical book American Freedom and Catholic
Power.2 6 As Thomas Berg writes, "[L]iberal intellectuals around
mid-century came to define themselves heavily in terms of opposition to the Church, which they viewed as an authoritarian force that
threatened
reasoned inquiry, democratic politics, and social unity. , 27
Of course, liberals were not the only ones voicing criticism
of Catholics; that sentiment was also widespread among religious
Americans, particularly evangelicals and other conservative Protestant sects.28 Here, although much has stayed the same, one gets a
sense of how much has changed at the same time. Certain aspects
of the mid-century critique of Catholicism, such as the concern
over the issue of public support for parochial schools, shared a
common theme with criticisms of Catholics evident in both the
early Republic and in the nineteenth century, when Catholicism
was associated with immigration. Critics feared the Catholic
Church as a foreign body in the United States, under the sway of
"an organization that is alien in spirit and control." 29 Although it
MARK S. MASSA, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE
PREJUDICE (2d ed. 2005).
See, e.g., JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN
25.
FREEDOM: A HISTORY (2004). For a broader history of law and religion in
America that features a substantial discussion of anti-Catholicism in the nineteenth century, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

(2004).
26.
PAUL BLANSHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER
(1949). For a discussion of the book's popularity, and the extent to which it
described "fears widely shared in the liberal Protestant 'Establishment' in America... in the years immediately after the Second World War," see MASSA, supra note 17, at 1-2.
Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Rela27.
tions, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 124 (2001) (citing John T. McGreevy, Thinking

on One's Own: Catholicism in the American Intellectual Imagination, 19281960, J. AM. HIST., June 1997, at 97).

28.
29.

See id. at 124-25.

RANDALL BALMER, GOD IN THE WHITE HOUSE: How FArrH SHAPED
THE PRESIDENCY FROM JOHN F. KENNEDY TO GEORGE W. BUSH 11 (2008)
(quoting BLANSHARD, supra note 26, at 4, 5).
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was hardly new, 30 it is striking that the language of many of the
anti-Catholic religious groups echoed a theme that is now more
closely associated with the secular world, that of separation of
church and state. Thus, as Thomas Berg notes, the mainline Protestant magazine The Christian Century argued that the Catholic
Church "would use any method 'to blur the principle of separation
of church and state.' 3 This language differs from the kind of rhetoric one sees today, in which many evangelical Christians, having
established schools of their own, now form a community of interest on this and other issues with many American Catholics. 32 This
change in rhetoric and argument shows the extent to which the
public discourse on the relationship between religion and politics
has obscured the shifts in positions and alliances over the years. 33
The Catholic Church itself has also changed. Its formal position in the pre-Vatican II era remained fairly anti-liberal by modem lights, teaching "that religious freedom was not a moral ideal in
itself, but at most a prudential accommodation to the fact of diversity in religious beliefs." 34 That fact may lend a different perspective to some of the fears voiced in those years that Catholicism
"was inconsistent with a democratic political system."3 Certainly
some of the criticism of the Church and its role in American politics was more thoughtful and credible, and less poisonous and fervid, than the critics' worst outbursts-the letters and pamphlets
likening voting for a Catholic candidate to "voting for a Fascist, a
Nazi," and arguing that "[t]he Pope wants rich America under
Catholic control. 36
What the Church's critics failed to see, perhaps, was that
any blanket characterization of American Catholics as anti30. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 25.
31.
Berg, supra note 27, at 126 (quoting Editorial, Getting Down to Cases, 64 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1512, 1513 (1947)).
32. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Church and State in the United States:
Competing Conceptions and Historic Changes, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
503, 511-12 (2006).

33. For more on this subject, with particular attention to the parochial
school funding and school prayer issues, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E.
Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279
(2001).
34. Berg, supra note 27, at 133.
35. See id. at 136; see also BALMER, supra note 29, at 37-38.
36. BALMER, supra note 29, at 20.
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freedom, or anti-separationist, based on the official statements of
the Church, hardly reflected the reality that American Catholics
had long since emerged as fully participating citizens who shared a
common set of values with their non-Catholic neighbors. Indeed,
as Garry Wills notes, the rise of Kennedy was coincident with
what, until now, was probably "[t]he peak of Catholic prestige and
influence" in American public life.37 Moreover, the critics also
neglected the extent to which Catholic intellectual currents were
moving in the same pluralistic direction as the laity. As American
Catholics were moving into the mainstream of public life, the theologian John Courtney Murray was "articulat[ing] in theory what
most American Catholics believed instinctively: religious freedom
is a human right, and while church and state need not be rigidly
separate and could cooperate fruitfully, the Church should not have
a privileged connection with the government."38 Not long before

37.
GARRY WILLS, HEAD AND HEART: AMERICAN CHRISTIANITIEs 457
(2008).
38.
Berg, supra note 27, at 139; see, e.g., JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.,
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1965). In a very thoughtful response to
a draft of this Article, Professor Leslie Griffin has argued that the fact that the
Kennedy campaign consulted Murray in drafting Kennedy's address suggests
that Kennedy's speech does not constitute a strategy of avoidance or privatization of religion, as I argue here, but rather is part of an effort to find ways of
"engag[ing] pluralistically in a country where other people did not hold your
(true) faith." Email from Leslie Griffin, Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center, to Paul Horowitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of
Alabama School of Law (Oct. 12, 2008, 12:44 CST) (on file with author). Kennedy advisor Ted Sorenson recalls "reading the text over the phone" to Murray.
See MASSA, supra note 17, at 143. Professor Griffin points to Murray's own
work, which did not privatize religion but sought to find ways for Catholics to
engage in intercredal cooperation with others without sacrificing their truthclaims, as supporting this reading of the Kennedy speech.
Professor Griffin's perspective on this is an important one. It is worth
noting, however, that other students of the relationship between Murray and the
Kennedy campaign are skeptical of the notion that Kennedy's speech represents
any kind of thorough adoption of Murray's own perspective. See MASSA, supra
note 17, at 142-43, discussing the connection between Murray and Kennedy and
arguing that:
positing such a mentoring role for Murray demands a sophisticated understanding of the Catholic natural law discourse in
which Murray was engaged---an understanding that would not
have immediately furthered the political goals of Kennedy in
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Kennedy sought the presidency, Murray had been sidelined by the
Vatican, lending some ammunition to American critics of the
Church's role in public and political life.3 9 It would not be long,
however, before Murray's views enjoyed a resurgence of popularity, not only in American life but also within the Church itself,
whose changing views on religious liberty during Vatican II substantially bore Murray's imprint."° So the Church's critics were
chasing after fading phantoms. It is nonetheless important, however, not to miss the extent to which the Church's views have
changed over time, making its mid-century critics' views perhaps
seem even more objectionable to modem ears. 4'
All of this simply provides a broader background to Kennedy the candidate and the faith-based criticisms that surrounded
him. Looking to Kennedy himself, however, there is some disagreement about the nature and extent of Kennedy's own religious
beliefs, although some of the disagreement clearly owes something
to the zeal of the defenders of Kennedy's public image. The child
of a devout Catholic, Kennedy certainly observed many of the
forms of his faith,42 but "did not appear to be interested in Catholic
piety or devotional life., 43 Although his biographer Theodore Sorenson argued against those who suggested that Kennedy was not
"deeply religious,""4 and others who argued that Kennedy "never
showed 'any special interest in Catholicism,'" Sorenson himself
Kennedy
said that Kennedy never cared "a whit for theology."
certainly never concealed his faith, 7 but one student of religious
faith and the American presidency concludes that Kennedy's "faith
any event, however conversant Kennedy may have been with
scholastic philosophy (an unlikely eventuality).
Id. at 142-43. Murray himself later said that Kennedy was "far more of a separationist than I am." Id. at 143.
39.
See, e.g., Berg, supra note 27, at 135-36.
40.
POLITICS
41.
CHANGE:

See, e.g., E.J. DIONNE, JR., SOULED OUT: RECLAIMING FAITH &
AFTER THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT 154-55 (2008).
See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 154-58 (2005).

42. See, e.g., SMrrH, supra note 18, at 260-63.
43. Id. at 260.
44. See id. at 261 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
45.
Id. at 261 (quoting LAWRENCE FUCHS, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND
AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 164 (1967)).
46. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
47.
See id.
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had much less influence on his thinking and policies than that of..
. other presidents."4 8 Rather, and in keeping with those who staffed
the administration of the New Frontier, 49 Kennedy was a classic
technocrat who "sought to achieve a technically based consensus
to direct politics, similar to the one that guided the scientific community."50 In short, while Kennedy certainly was rooted in Catholic belief and practice, he either was not deeply religious or managed to find a distinction between his religious beliefs and his
public role as a politician and policy-maker.
Nevertheless, Kennedy's religion occupied center stage in
his candidacy and was the subject of repeated attack on the
grounds already discussed: that Catholicism was an "alien" faith,
that electing a Catholic as President would effectively place the
Pope in the Oval Office, and that a Catholic would tear down the
wall of separation between church and state. 1 Kennedy sought
unsuccessfully to preempt such criticisms by citing both the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Religious Test
Clause of the Constitution, which states that "no religious Test
shall ever be required as a qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States. 52 Under those clauses, he argued,
any such criticisms violated the principle that "our government
cannot-directly or indirectly, carelessly or intentionally-select
53
any religious body for either favorable or unfavorable treatment."
This rhetorical strategy, however, did not succeed in staving off criticisms of Kennedy's faith. Although Kennedy hoped
that his decisive primary victory over Hubert Humphrey in the
substantially non-Catholic state of West Virginia would put the
issue to rest, it did not. 4 So it was that Kennedy found himself
48.

49.

Id. at 260.
See, e.g., DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST

(1972).
50.
SMITH, supra note 18, at 263 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
51.
See generally BALMER, supra note 29, at 10-12; SMITH, supra note
18, at 266-71.
52.
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3.
53.
See BALMER, supra note 29, at 13-14. In fact, as I have shown elsewhere, the Religious Test Clause does not forbid candidates from being asked or
answering such questions-although it does not forbid them from refusing to
answer those questions either.
54.
See BALMER, supra note 29, at 19-3 1; SMITH, supra note 18, at 268.
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agreeing to come, like Daniel into the lions' den, to the Rice Hotel
in Houston to speak before some three hundred Protestant ministers at the Houston Ministerial Association on September 12,
1960."
Kennedy began his speech by arguing that "[w]hile the socalled religious issue is necessarily and properly the chief topic
here tonight," many other issues ought to be "far more critical. 56
Among them were "the spread of communist influence," slums,
education, and the space race." Kennedy added, "These are the
real issues which should decide this campaign. And they are not
religious issues-for war and hunger and ignorance and despair
know no religious barrier."58 As a preliminary approach to his
overall strategy of avoidance, Kennedy thus began by minimizing,
even scoffing at, any suggestion that religion ought to pose a significant concern for voters. 9 Rather, he suggested, voters ought to
focus on the panoply of pressing public issues that confront them
on the eve of the election. Read charitably, Kennedy appeared to
be suggesting that these issues are not "religious" issues because
they pose no significant "religious barrier" to a broad public consensus; all people of good faith, no matter what that faith may be,
recognize that these are serious issues. 60
Read more literally, however, Kennedy could not have possibly meant what he said. As any reader of the Beatitudes, or of
many other significant religious texts, surely must understand,
"war and hunger and ignorance and despair" are quintessentially
"religious issues."6 ' For many deeply religious individuals, these
issues, and the manner in which individuals approach them, implicate any number of deep questions about faith and its manifestation
through works. Thus, Kennedy opened his speech awkwardly and
in error. These remarks, however, are simply a prelude to a broad55.
See, e.g., BALMER, supra note 29, at 32.
56. Id. at 176. Balmer's book reprints Kennedy's speech in full, and I
cite to his book in discussing Kennedy's speech. For a full text transcription of
the speech, see President John F. Kennedy, Address to the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association (Dec. 12, 1960), available at http://www.american
rhetoric.com/speeches/jfkhoustonministers.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2008).
57.
Id.
58.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 176.
59.
Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.
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er, and equally disturbing, approach to the question of the relationship between religion and politics.
Kennedy's speech proceeded to what is surely the most
famous passage of the address, prefaced by the statement that "it is
apparently necessary for me to state once again-not what kind of
church I believe in, for that should be important only to me-but
what kind of America I believe in. 62 It is worth quoting at length:
I believe in an America where the separation of
church and state is absolute; where no Catholic prelate would tell the President-should he be Catholic-how to act, and no Protestant minister would
tell his parishioners for whom to vote; where no
church or church school is granted any public funds
or political preference, and where no man is denied
public office merely because his religion differs
from the president who might appoint him, or the
people who might elect him.
I believe in an America that is officially neither
Catholic, Protestant, nor Jewish; where no public
official either requests or accepts instructions on
public policy from the pope, the National Council
of Churches, or any other ecclesiastical source;
where no religious body seeks to impose its will directly or indirectly upon the general populace or the
public acts of its officials, and where religious liberty is so indivisible that an act against one church is
treated as an act against all.63
Once again, looking at this passage through political eyes,
one can see Kennedy the candidate masterfully attempting to defuse a variety of attacks launched against him by combining them
under the general rubric of "the separation of church and state" and
the indivisibility of "religious liberty." Thus, at the same time that
he denied any authority of a "Catholic prelate" to tell him how to
act as President, he also argued that Protestant ministers are forbidden from telling their flock how to vote in the election. At the
62.
63.

Id.
Id. at 176-77.
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same time that he denied the interest in preferring Catholic parochial schools for purposes of public funding, he argued that the
same principle barred the voters from denying him the Oval Office
simply because of his religious beliefs.
As politically successful as this rhetorical strategy may
have been, it is far less satisfying on a close reading. To fully appreciate this, one must consider a later piece of the address:
Finally, I believe in an America where ... there is
no Catholic vote, no anti-Catholic vote, no bloc voting of any kind, and where Catholics, Protestants,
and Jews, at both the lay. and the pastoral levels,
will refrain from those attitudes of disdain and division which have so often marred their works in the
past, and promote instead the American ideal of
brotherhood. . . . [My vision of the presidency]
represents a great office that must be neither humbled by making it the instrument of any religious
group, nor tarnished by arbitrarily withholding itits occupancy from the members of any one religious group. I believe in a President whose views
on religion are his own private affair, neither imposed upon him by the nation, nor imposed by the
nation upon him as a condition to holding that office.'
Reading both passages together, one can understand why
Mark Massa has written that Kennedy's Houston speech can be
"seen as a key moment, not only in American Catholicism's 'coming of age,' but also of the articulation of the terms of that rite of
passage., 65 Kennedy offered a vision of the church-state separation
that is at once both liberating and constraining for the participation
of religious believers in public life. His vision of separation liberates by eliminating any barriers to the successful participation of
religious believers in politics. "No man is denied public office
merely because his religion differs from ... the people who might
elect him." 6 It treats separation not only as a formal rule con64.
65.
66.

Id. at 177-78.
MASSA, supra note 17, at 131 (emphasis in original).
BALMER, supra note 29, at 176.
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straining government action, a statement about whether any government office can be "officially... Catholic, Protestant, [or] Jewish, ' 67 but as an informal constraint on the decisions of private citizens entering the voting booth. If religion has no place in political
decision-making, private and public, then it cannot prevent a
member of any religion from becoming President.
Kennedy thus
68
"became a symbol of American pluralism."
At the same time, Kennedy accepted a high price, not only
on his behalf but also on the voters' as well, for the advance of
religious pluralism in the American political landscape. He made a
private affair of his own religion, severing it from any deep ties of
obligation or belief that might color or command his own views on
policy. He also went a step further. For if the nation can neither
"impose[ ]" religious views on a candidate for office nor treat religion "as a condition to holding that office," then religion ceases to
be a valid factor in the voters' deliberations. 69 It becomes "a private affair" for them as well.
This is not, perhaps, the most charitable reading of Kennedy's remarks. Nevertheless, ultimately it is impossible to understand Kennedy's words any other way. Kennedy's compromise
with the voters finally requires that neither he nor they should take
religion too seriously. Rather, it requires that they both should
refrain from viewing religion as a source of binding obligation
with resp t to either his actions in office or their choices as voters.
It is not just that this compromise is too costly. It is also impossible, at least in this culture. On a wide range of issues, certainly
including the classic hot-button issue of abortion, but extending to
questions of war and peace, the necessity and nature of various
social programs, and much more besides, religious voters cannot
separate what their religion demands from the question of which
candidate to support.
Even beyond particular issues, voters have always, wisely
or not, asked questions about the characterof the individuals they
select to occupy high elected office. To be sure, a thoughtful religious person can conclude that religious differences are not an absolute bar to the kinds of character concerns such as integrity, honor, or honesty that might influence his or her voting decisions.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 177.
WILLS, supra note 37, at 458.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 178.
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However, the voter need not make such a distinction, and on reflection, may conclude in particular instances that this distinction is
impossible. Either a sense of what a candidate's religious beliefs
say about his or her character, or a view of the virtues, including
belief in a particular religious truth, that ought to be present in a
particular candidate may preclude a voter from making this sort of
distinction. 0
Ultimately, then, Kennedy is asking the voters to do something that many of them cannot. One might reply that many voters
appeared to do just that in 1960. In an era of substantial social
consensus and the belief in the problem-solving nature of technology and secular liberal values, Americans demonstrated their willingness to accept the compromise Kennedy offered them. However, the ultimate failure of Kennedy's strategy of avoidance also
suggests that this compromise was doomed to fail from the very
beginning.
So far, the focus has been on the problems that Kennedy's
strategy of avoiding the "religious question" by privatizing religion
posed for religious voters. Kennedy's approach, however well it
may have corresponded to his own propensities, is equally problematic for candidates and office-holders as well. Kennedy imagined a world in which "no public official either requests or accepts instructions on public policy from the pope, the National
Council of Churches, or any other ecclesiastical source"; 7 where
"no Catholic prelate should tell the President-should he be Catholic-how to act";72 inwhich the "chief executive" is "not limited"
in the "fulfillment of his Presidential office ... by any religious
oath, ritual, or obligation."73 Perhaps this suited Kennedy, but it
may not be true for other office-holders, particularly other Catholic
politicians.74 They may wish to consider the teachings or instructions of the Pope, or of "Catholic prelates," which are authoritative
in some circumstances. Even if they do not consider themselves
70.

Cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 208 n.38

(2003) ("'Many Protestant groups... see no separation between the secular and
religious parts of their lives."' (quoting a letter from Professor Laura Underkuffler)).
71.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 177.
72.
Id. at 176.
73.
Id. at 178.
74.
See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussing the nature
and extent of Kennedy's religiosity).
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bound by those instructions-if, for instance, the Pope or prelate is
advising on a matter that falls outside the scope of the magisterium-they certainly may welcome counsel from those precincts,
and might even "request" it. Finally, they may conclude that some
commands not only conflict with the Constitution but are superior
to it. One response to this prospect is to allow voters to ask these
questions of the candidate before he takes office and to judge him
by his ability to "fulfill[ ] ...his presidential office" once he takes
it.7 '

However, Kennedy's strategy of avoidance, by seeking to
eliminate religion from political discourse and decision-making in
general, and from voters' decision-making in particular, closes off
this avenue of questioning.
Voters and candidates are thus left in a world in which they
either pretend that office-holders will face no significant conflicts
between their faith and their public obligations, or in which they
demand, perhaps futilely, that officials ignore these conflicts. In
either case, the voters are left with little remedy when the truth
turns out to be more complicated. Sanford Levinson, writing primarily about Justice William Brennan but drawing on Kennedy's
speech as well, has aptly characterized this view of a conflict-free
world as involving a "comic" view of the Constitution. 6 In this
view, the Constitution "provid[es] sufficiently 'happy endings' to
legal dilemmas so that, for example, fidelity to the Constitution
never require[s] the judge to acquiesce in something truly evil. 77
But to make this assumption and simply privilege the demands of
public office above those of religion turns obedience to the Constitution into a form of idolatry.78 Indeed, Kennedy's compromise,
which envelops both office-holders and voters alike, seeks to make
constitutional idolaters of us all.
Kennedy's approach does not simply exalt the Constitution,
however. In important respects, it also diminishes religion-not
simply by treating it as subordinate to public obligations, but by
implying that it is trivial. Kennedy does not say so in as many
75.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 177.
76.
Sanford Levinson, Is it Possible to Have a Serious Discussion About
Religious Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities?, 4 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
280,283 (2006)
77. LEVINSON, supra note 70, at 215-16.
78. LEVINSON, supra note 70, at 283 (quoting a letter from Professor
Thomas Shaffer in SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING WITH DIVERSITY 215 n.61
(2003)).
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words, and he does offer the usual paeans to religious liberty that
have graced many a political speech, writing of "an America where
religious intolerance will someday end, where all men and all
However, this language speaks
churches are treated as equal.,
only in terms of equality; it suggests that all religions are equally
important, but it does not explain how important they are. So, it is
that Kennedy's Catholicism became incidental. While denying,
understandably, that he was "the Catholic candidate for president,"8 ° Kennedy added that he was "the Democratic Party's candidate for president who happens also to be a Catholic."81 He turned
what, for many, is a bedrock aspect of their public and private
identity into mere happenstance.
All of this would be startling enough if applied to the world
of private actors. To take a standard example, imagine an argument that the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. acted wrongly by
allowing religion to motivate his struggle for civil rights, that the
two must remain separate, and that King was wrong to seek to impose his religiously derived views of the centrality of equality "indirectly upon the general populace." 8 This argument would seem
out of place when attributed to King's efforts as a private citizen.
However, Kennedy suggested that the calculus is different where
public officials are concerned. Kennedy argued that the Constitution itself is interposed between public officials and private actors.
As he had in the past,83 Kennedy raised the Religious Test Clause
of the Constitution, arguing that it forbids any voter from "requiring a religious test, even by indirection." On this broad view of
the Religious Test Clause, voters are constitutionally disabled from
asking religious questions of candidates, or voting against candidates for religious reasons.
This reading of the Religious Test Clause is far too broad.85
The Clause simply forbids the imposition of formal tests that
would preclude someone from taking office, or require a candidate
79

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

supra note 29, at 177.
Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 177.
See, e.g., id. at 13; THOMAS J.
BALMER,

HOUSE?: RELIGION,

A CATHOLIC IN THE WHITE
F. KENNEDY'S PRESIDENTIAL

CARTY,

POLITICS, AND JOHN.

CAMPAIGN 71-72 (2004) (paperback ed. 2008).
84. BALMER, supra note 29, at 178.
See Horwitz, supra note 4.
85.
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formally to avow or disavow a religion or religious precept as a
condition of taking office. To read it more broadly, to argue that
even "indirect[ ],,86 religious tests violate the constitutional bar, is
to forbid voters and candidates alike from having a meaningful
discussion about the ways in which a particular faith conduces, or
constrains, an office-holder's performance of his duties."7 As
stated before, this is a dangerous approach. At the same time that
Kennedy denied that religion could ever pose a meaningful conflict
with the performance of public duties, he also invoked the Reigious Test Clause to prevent voters from exercising the political
safeguard of asking particular candidates whether they are faced
with such conflicts, let alone voting to prevent such a conflictridden candidate from reaching office.88 To be sure, many voters
might exercise that right unwisely, but Kennedy's cure for this potential ill is as bad as the disease itself.
Although the discussion of Kennedy thus far has been critical, one might add some appreciative notes about his speech. First,
Kennedy added a note of sociological detail which was of great
importance to understanding the role of Catholics in American politics in 1960 (and today), and which may also have broader implications for understanding the role of religion in American politics
more generally. In arguing against those who would hold him accountable for every illiberal statement made by "Catholic church
leaders, usually in other countries, frequently in other centuries,
and rarely relevant to any situation here,"89 Kennedy pointed to
"the statement of the American bishops in 1948 which strongly
endorsed church-state separation, and which more nearly reflects
the views of almost every American Catholic." 9 This is important
because it suggests that Catholicism is not wholly monolithic and
unchanging, and that voters should be aware of its evolving views
on the relationship between church and state. Kennedy's statement
is also important for its focus on what it means to be an "American
Catholic" and on the notion that there may be distinctions between
what is said in Rome and what is believed in American pews. 9' It
suggests that voters should not treat the Church as a specter or a
86.

BALMER, supra note 29, at 178.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See generally Levinson, supra note 76.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
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bogeyman, but instead should consider the ways in which both the
Church and its members have become fully a part of the fabric of
American life, altering both themselves and public life in the
process. sKennedy's
am
car fiecien wamention
r by h s of his• own
92 military service, and the
sacrifices made in war by his family, serve as forceful reminders
that, whatever voters might make of "carefully select[ed] quotations [taken] out of context" suggesting that there is a divide between Catholic belief and public service,93 in practice Catholic
Americans have been every bit as loyal to their country as their
non-Catholic brethren. The broader lesson here, perhaps, is that
voters cannot make general assumptions about what it means to be
Catholic, or Jewish, or Muslim, or a member of any other faith.
They must keep in mind the unique and shifting ways in which
both religious identity and American civic identity have influenced
and accommodated one another, so that one must talk about being
an American Catholic or Jew or Muslim.
Second, despite his articulation of the comic view that there
can be no meaningful conflict between the commands of faith and
the commands of public service, Kennedy ultimately acknowledged that there may come a point beyond which compromise is
impossible:
But if the time should ever come-and I do not
concede any conflict to be remotely possible-when
my office would require me to either violate my
conscience or violate the national interest, then I
would resign the office; and I hope any conscientious public servant would do likewise.94
Thus, Kennedy did finally concede that religion can be important
to the conscience of a public servant and that it may even finally
prevent him from carrying out his duties consistently with his constitutional oath. Quite rightly, he did not suggest that the mere
possibility of such a conflict should disqualify anyone from public
office. Rather, he stated that the appropriate remedy here, if a politician simply cannot comply with both sets of obligations, is to
leave office. In keeping with his comic view of the Constitution
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 178.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
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and his privatized view of religion, he was unwilling to "concede
any [such] conflict to be remotely possible."95 At least, however,
he somewhat redeemed both religion and the Constitution by acknowledging the stakes involved in both and rendering them something more than comic.
Third, it is worthwhile to note an important distinction
Kennedy made throughout his speech. Although the main current
of his address suggests a strategy of avoidance, by arguing that
religion simply cannot be a relevant matter for either candidates or
voters, he also made a somewhat more subtle point. He argued
that the presidency must not be "tarnished by arbitrarilywithholding [its] occupancy from the members of any one religious group,"
and later that the election should not be "decided on the basis that
forty million Americans lost their chance of being president on the
day they were being baptized." 96 In other words, it is not simply
the use of religion as a qualifying or disqualifying factor by voters
that should be disturbing. It is the refusal to think further and deeper-the blanket assumption by voters that membership in a faith
should be disqualifying in and of itself.
Finally, it is worth noting what Kennedy said after the formal address was over, and the fact that he said anything at all. By
design, Kennedy spoke to a hostile audience, and he did not leave
when the address was over. Rather, he willingly accepted audience
questions, a number of them "acrimonious." 97 Kennedy closed his
appearance with the following remarks:
I don't want anyone to think, because they interrogate me on this important question, that I regard that
as unfair or unreasonable or that somebody who is
concerned about the matter is prejudiced or bigoted.
I think religion is basic in the establishment of the
American system, and, therefore, any candidate for
the office, I think, should submit himself to the
questions of any reasonable man.
My only limit would be that if somebody said, "Regardless of Senator Kennedy's position, regardless
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 177, 180 (emphasis added).
Id. at 34.
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of how much evidence he has given that what he
says he means, I still won't vote for him because he
is a member of that church."
I would consider that unreasonable. What I consider to be reasonable in an exercise of free will and
choice is to ask Senator Kennedy to state his views
as broadly as possible. Investigate his record to see
whether he states what he believes and then make
an independent and rational judgment as to whether
he could be entrusted with this highly important position.9'
These remarks, again, demonstrate a tension with the thrust of his
address. Kennedy did suggest, in keeping with his argument
against the arbitrary withholding of support on religious grounds,
that religious questions are not necessarily illegitimate in a political campaign and that one may fairly and in an unprejudiced fashion have concerns about the relationship between a particular
candidate's religious views and his fitness for office. Commendably, he suggested that these are perfectly reasonable questions and
that a candidate may reasonably be expected to answer them, although he adds the important caveat that such questions ought to
be voiced in a reasonable manner. These remarks are in some tension, however, with the thrust of his strategy of avoidance-that
religion is a "private affair" that should not be raised as a barrier to
the holding of public office, and that even indirect inquiries of this
sort violate the Religious Test Clause.
At the same time, it is not clear exactly what Kennedy
means in his peroration when he suggests that it would be reasonable to "ask [him] to state his views as broadly as possible."" These
words can be taken in two ways. Kennedy might be suggesting
here that the only "views" that should be rele'ant to public inquiry
are views on matters of public policy, thus again excluding religion
from the ambit of any reasonable questioning. That seems inconsistent with the rest of his concluding remarks, however. Perhaps
the better reading is that Kennedy believes questions on a candidate's religion are acceptable, but should be phrased only in a gen98.
99.

Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
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eral way and should be closely linked to the candidate's actual
record in office. That kind of compromise is still a popular one in
public discourse about religion and politics, but it is far from clear
that such a compromise is either beneficial or acceptable. To permit the public discussion of religion only on the condition that
such speech is cast in the broadest possible terms may, in the long
run, be even worse than not discussing it at all, and may prove
even less respectful of religion than a simple strategy of silence.' °
In the end, Kennedy's speech, and his broader approach to
the relationship between religion and American politics, was a politically successful but deeply problematic attempt to resolve the
tension between the two. As Mark Massa has observed, the very
fact that Kennedy was pressed on the "Catholic question," and the
simple fact of his political victory, presents a painful irony. Kennedy's election demonstrated that someone of even what was then
viewed by many as an "alien" faith could hope to succeed in seeking the highest office in the land. But it did so by rendering that
faith unimportant, by denying the link between one's own faith and
one's performance in public office, and by denying that link on the
voters' behalf as well. In short, Kennedy achieved a victory for
religious pluralism. But in doing so, he "'seculariz[ed]' the American public square by privatizing personal belief."' '° It is of little
wonder, then, that even some of his closest Catholic allies were
ultimately discomfited by the strategy of avoidance Kennedy pursued all the way to the White House.' 02
III. MIrr ROMNEY: INCLUSION WITHOUT ENGAGEMENT
Nearly half a century separates John F. Kennedy's speech
on religion and politics from the speech given by former Massachusetts governor and 2008 Republican presidential candidate Mitt
Romney on December 6, 2007. During that time, religion's role in
American politics changed dramatically, as did the role of religion
in the United States more generally. That story is too long to tell
here, but most readers will be familiar with many of the most salient elements of the narrative: the growth in the number of people
who profess no religion at all or treat religion as less central to
100.
101.
102.

See Horwitz, supra note 4.
MASSA, supra note 17, at 146.
See, e.g., McGREEvY, supra note 25, at 213.

996

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 39

their lives; the corresponding increase in the number of Americans
who do treat religion as a primary influence and who adhere to
ever more fervent religious views; and the rise of evangelical
Christianity and its resurgence as a political force.
Religion, in short, has become a more powerful force in
American politics in the last half-century, in part precisely because
it has become less of a bedrock assumption. More Americans have
abandoned their faith or have found it anew, and the nation has
moved through and past periods of technocratic politics and consensus about the basic liberal values that undergird liberal democracies. In the process, religion has become a more central and
powerful force in American politics at the same time as, and because, it has become a more contested element of the social fabric.
Beyond the larger social context in which each speech took
place, there are other similarities and differences between the two
speeches. Kennedy spoke in a period in which Catholicism in
America was still the subject of widespread suspicion and prejudice. That hostility, though, was largely above-board, not couched
in code words or hints. Also, Kennedy ultimately spoke not to
reassure voters that his Catholicism was a commendable quality in
and of itself, but to remove fears that he would manifest his Catholic faith in public life. In some ways, Romney, a devout Mormon
and scion of past leaders of the church, spoke out of similar needs.
As Romney's campaign progressed, the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints remained the subject of widespread fears and
questions among many Republican primary voters, particularly
evangelical Christians, who believed that Mormonism, like Catholicism, was not true Christianity.'0 3
Like Kennedy, Romney found himself obliged to confront
his doubters and explain his faith and its relationship to the presidency; nevertheless, the differences in the context in which Romney spoke far outweigh the similarities. For one thing, Romney's
critics were hardly an organized or public force. Although many
individual voters voiced doubts about his faith, anti-Mormon sentiment was neither as open nor as institutionalized as the anti-

103.
See, e.g., Romney Faces Uphill Battle for Evangelical Voters, (NPR
radio broadcast July 5, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story
/story.php?storyId= 1762390 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
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Catholic criticism faced by Kennedy.'O" Nor did Romney's faith
play precisely the same role in animating his critics that Kennedy's
faith did. Unlike the critics of Kennedy, who feared that his Catholicism would control his public decisions, few if any of Romney's
critics suggested that he would follow his church's bidding in any
way that would steer him away from the conservative path favored
by many GOP primary voters. Rather, it was his faith in and of
itself, its history, its doctrines, its sheer strangeness, that disturbed
these voters.' 5 For reasons that can ultimately be linked to the
content of his speech, Romney's tactical approach was also different. While Kennedy spoke to a hostile audience and welcomed
their questions, Romney spoke before a room packed with supporters and took no questions.
If the context of both speeches shows something of the contrast between them, the content of Romney's speech lays bare
these differences even more clearly.'°6 In some respects, it offers a
commendable move forward from Kennedy's own strategy of
avoidance. It describes a relationship between religion and American politics that gives both religious candidates and voters alike far
more room to express themselves fully and completely, and paints
a far more satisfying picture of the role of religion in public life.
At the same time, however, Romney's vision of a politically engaged religiosity commits a common error on the part of many
who would argue for the wholesome involvement of religion in
public life. It allows religion into public dialogue, but only in a
one-sided way, in which religion can be a source of praise but not
of thoughtful criticism. In its own way, this strategy, a strategy of
inclusion without meaningful engagement, risks trivializing religion every bit as much as Kennedy's own privatizing approach.

104.
See, e.g., Op-Ed., Kenneth L. Woodward, Mitt Romney is No Jack
Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2007, at A31.
105.
See Garry Wills, Romney and JFK: The Difference, N.Y. REV.
BooKs, Jan. 17, 2008, at 32 (noting that although "the situations are superficially the same" between Kennedy and Romney's speeches, "the obstacles are quite
different"). Wills argues that Kennedy's critics "were more solidly political" in
questioning his faith, while the objections to Romney's faith were more "theological and cultural." Id.
106.
Garry Wills has written, "Kennedy had to convince people that he
would not let the Vatican push him around. Romney ... let evangelicals know
that he would let them push him around." Id.
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Romney opens in a manner that is starkly different from
Kennedy's own approach. Rather than argue that religion is a distraction from the central issues that face the nation, he embraces it
as one of the key issues: "Today, I wish to address a topic which I
believe is fundamental to America's greatness: our religious liberty.''1°7 He promises to "offer perspectives on how my own faith
would inform my Presidency, if I were elected."'8 In contrast to
Kennedy, Romney argues that anyone "who may feel that religion
is not a matter to be seriously considered in the context of the
weighty threats that face us" is wrong.'09 More forcefully than
Kennedy, he invokes history in support of his view, citing what he
describes as the Founders' view that religion is essential in guiding
the moral sentiments of the people." °
Romney's next argument is somewhat more controversial.
He says, "Freedom requires religion just as religion requires freedom. Freedom opens the windows of the soul so that man can discover his most profound beliefs and commune with God. Freedom
and religion endure together, or perish alone.'
This argument
lent itself to some criticism, on the grounds that it appears to leave
out a purely secular understanding of human freedom, let alone
constitutional freedom, and so is dismissive of non-religious citizens.' Romney is not alone in his belief that religion is central to
a deeper understanding of human freedom, however. Various
writers have argued that religion is fundamental to a basic understanding113of human rights, whether intrinsically or for historical
reasons."'
Such a belief,
contested
it may
be, istreat
not necessarily dismissive
of the however
non-religious
citizen.
It does
reli-

107.
Mitt Romney, Former Mass. Governor, Faith in America, at the
George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas (Dec. 6, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/us/politics/06textromney.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009)) [hereinafter Romney].
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
See id.
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See, e.g., Roger Cohen, Op-Ed., Secular Europe's Merits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at A41.
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gion as a foundation of human freedom; but it does not follow
from this that non-religious individuals are not similarly entitled to
remain free to believe as they choose. Indeed, the importance of
individual choice to religious salvation can serve as a religious
basis for protecting atheism or agnosticism every bit as much as
religious belief.14 Thus, the criticism raised against Romney for
this statement is overstated.
Similarly, some critics of Romney's speech have argued
that it values religion but says nothing about those who have no
religious beliefs or have specifically non-religious beliefs. The
New York Times columnist David Brooks, for example, complained, "Romney described a community yesterday. Observant
Catholics, Baptists, Methodists, Jews and Muslims are inside that
community. The nonobservant are not. There was not even a perfunctory sentence showing respect for the nonreligious."" 5 On its
face, this criticism is fair enough. Romney does not mention the
non-religious." 6 Neither, however, does Romney single out the
non-religious for exclusion, and his omission here can be read as
more incidental than intentional." 7 For what it is worth, Romney
himself later characterized the omission of non-religious individuals as a missed opportunity, telling an audience that, "[i]n a free
society ... non-believers have just as great a stake as believers in
defending religious liberty .... Religious liberty and liberality of
thought flow from the common conviction that it is freedom, not
' 18
coercion, that exalts the individual just as it raises up the nation."
This is something less than a full-throated defense of the nonreligious; it suggests that they too should value religious freedom,
114. See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX 171-73 (1980)
(discussing early American Puritan and Congregational support for religious
voluntarism and individualism).
115. David Brooks, Op-Ed., Faith vs. the Faithless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,
2007, at A31; see Letters, Romney and the Religion Question, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2007, at A16.
116. See, e.g., Romney, supra note 107 (delivering a lengthy paean to
various religious groups and omitting any mention of non-religious groups).
117. Brooks speculates, however, that Romney left the non-religious out of
his speech "in order to generate howls of outrage in the liberal press." Brooks,
supra note 115, at A31.
118. The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Romneys Awarded 12th Canterbury Medal - Reiterates that "Freedom Requires Religion," May 9, 2008,
http://www.becketfund.org/index.php/article/777.html.

1000

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 39

but it does not say much about what role they can play as citizens
and whether they can be acceptable public office-holders.11 9 But it
is far from dismissive. In sum, the criticism of Romney on the
grounds that he excludes the non-religious is overstated.
Romney goes on to openly equate himself with Kennedy in
answering what he believes are "[appropriate] questions regarding
an aspiring candidate's religion.' 20 Like Kennedy, he says he is
"an American running for President" whose candidacy is not defined by his religion. 2 He similarly assures voters that "no authorities of my church. . . will ever exert influence on presidential decisions. Their authority is theirs, within the province of church
affairs, and it ends where the affairs of the nation begin."1 22 This
statement is marginally more welcoming than Kennedy's own
speech, inasmuch as it implies that church leaders have some authority to speak to their flocks on matters of public concern. At the
same time, like Kennedy's speech, it seems to erect some distinction between "church affairs" and "the affairs of the nation."
Again, this seems an unstable distinction. Perhaps Romney means
to suggest that the only concern of the church is either the inward,
spiritual life of the worshipper or matters internal to the church as
an institution. For most churches, however, spirituality is not
simply private. Faith and its obligations have deep implications
for the most pressing public matters.
Moreover, like Kennedy, Romney flirts with what Professor Levinson calls the "comic" view of the Constitution, and what
Professor
tu" 123 Shaffer labels a somewhat idolatrous view of the Constitution.
He does not simply exalt the Constitution by declaring
that he "will put no doctrine of any church above the.., sovereign
authority of the law.' 24 He also offers a broader defense of this
119. For more evidence of his views on this point, see Leslie Griffin, Political Reason, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 493, 499 (2007) (quoting
Romney as saying, "the American people want to see a person of faith lead the
nation, and I don't think the American people care very deeply about which
brand of faith that is" (quoting Robert B. Bluey, Q & A: Mitt Romney Discusses
Iraq War, Reagan's Influence and Gay Marriage, Jan. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.humanevents.comarticle.php?id=18683)).
120. Romney, supra note 107.
121.
Id.
122. Id.
123.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
124.
Romney, supra note 107.
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approach, arguing that he subscribes to Abraham Lincoln's description of "America's 'political religion'-the commitment to
defend the rule of law and the Constitution., 125 The Presidential
oath of office, he says, will "become[ ] my highest promise to
God," one that requires him to 1serve
only "the common cause of
26
States"
United
the
of
people
the
On the one hand, this statement suggests a correspondence
between Romney's religious and political duties. It suggests that
religion need not present a conflict with politics-that, to the contrary, taking an oath to fulfill one's office with the interests of all
citizens in mind can itself become a high religious calling. 127
Romney thus usefully reminds his audience of the ways in which
religious faith can support, rather than conflict with, a politician's
commitment to public office. The marriage between a politician's
public commitments and his faith may not always be as easy as
Romney suggests, however. Indeed, in this regard, Romney takes
a step further than Kennedy. While Kennedy acknowledges the
possibility of conflict between his faith and his office-albeit he
doubts that such a conflict is "remotely possible" and says he
would resign if such a conflict arose-Romney refuses to concede
that such a conflict could ever exist. Perhaps the reasons for this
lie in the differences between Catholic and Mormon doctrine; perhaps there is simply no room for a conflict between faith and politics in Romney's case. Nevertheless, apart from the fact that
Romney's view offers little guidance to politicians of other faiths
for whom a conflict might be more conceivable, it is hard not to
see a comic view of religion and the Constitution alike when a
candidate refuses to admit even the possibility that one's office
might demand something different than one's faith.
In the next section of Romney's speech, he comes to the
heart of those "questions regarding an aspiring candidate's religion" that he considers "appropriate.' ' 2' Rejecting those who
would ask himself to "distance [himself] from [his] religion," he
says, "I believe in my Mormon faith and I endeavor to live by it.
My faith is the faith of my fathers-I will be true to them and to
125.
Id.
126.
Id.
127.
Judge William Pryor has taken a similar position. See William H.
Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347 (2006).
128.
Romney, supra note 107.
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my beliefs."' 9 He answers the "fundamental question" he says he
has often been asked by saying that he "believe[s] that Jesus Christ
is the Son of God and the Savior of mankind," while adding that
his "church's beliefs about Christ may not all be the same as those
of other faiths."'"3 Romney continues by saying:
There are some who would have a presidential candidate describe and explain his church's distinctive
doctrines. To do so would enable the very religious
test the founders prohibited in the Constitution....
It is important to recognize that while differences in
theology exist between the churches in America, we
share a common creed of moral convictions. And
where the affairs of the nation are concerned, it's
usually a sound rule to focus on the latter-on the
great moral principles that urge us all on a common
131
course.
This is both the most fascinating portion of Romney's
speech and the most troubling. Romney simultaneously avows the
importance of faith in grounding a political candidate and officeholder, its ability to "urge us all on a common course," and is deliberate and specific in placing a divine Christ at the heart of his
own faith-and argues that questions about "his church's distinctive doctrines" are out of bounds. 32 Note that this is not simply a
warmed-over version of Kennedy's speech. Kennedy argues that
no voter should "arbitrarily" deny an entire faith the possibility of
holding public office. Romney extends this argument by insisting
that no individual candidate can be pressed in any detail about his
own understanding of his religious beliefs and how they relate to
his performance of a public office. Professor Noah Feldman has
written, sharply but fairly, that this formulation "stak[es] his chabeliefs while insisting that no one
racter and values on his religious
133
are."'
beliefs
those
what
ask

129. Id.
130. Id.
131.
Id.
132. Id.
133.
Noah Feldman, What Is It About Mormonism?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Jan. 6, 2008, at 36.
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There are certainly more charitable ways to understand
Romney's remarks. One reading, which Professor Leslie Griffin
has advanced based on other remarks by Romney, is that Romney's approach is ultimately connected to his praise for Lincoln's
language of "political religion." On this view, the only religiously
related question voters may soundly ask of a political candidate is
about his or her "values," not "individual theologies."' 4 Romney
is thus putting at issue only the general moral principles to which
he subscribes-values that he elsewhere describes as "quintessential American values; that my religious beliefs are consistent with
the religious beliefs of other Judeo-Christian faiths, such as a belief
in the divinity of God and the need to provide service to others,
[and] the preeminence of the family unit."'35
By trafficking in these generalities, Romney's statements
should not be read as raising more complex theological questions
and, therefore, cannot reasonably be challenged on those questions.
Romney's remarks thus can be read as signaling that he "will govern according to quintessential American values that are not
based on his or any other religious tradition."'36 In citing general
tenets of Christianity, Romney asks "citizens to be governed only
by those ideals 'which they can reasonably be expected to endorse,"" 37 while "free[ing] the political marketplace of ideas from
extensive theological debate.""'3 Thus, later in his speech, he asserts:
Perhaps the most important question to ask a person
of faith who seeks a political office, is this: does he
share these American values: the equality of human
kind, the obligation to serve one another, and a
steadfast commitment to liberty?

134.

Globe Staff, Interview, Romney Aligns With Christian Right,
Mar. 17, 2006, at B4 (quoted in Griffin, supra note 119, at

BOSTON GLOBE,

499).
135.
Interview by Robert B. Bluey, Q & A: Mitt Romney Discusses Iraq
War,
Reagan's
Influence
and Gay
Marriage,
Jan.
1, 2007,
http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=18683 (last visited Feb. 22, 2009).
136.
See Griffin, supra note 119, at 500.
137.
Id. at 505 (quoting JOHN RAwLs, POLmrIcAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
138.
Id.
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They are not unique to any one denomination. They
belong to the great moral inheritance we hold in
common. They are the firm ground on which
Americans of different faiths meet and stand as a
nation, united. 3 9
In Griffin's view, if this is Romney's approach, he is simply following "the Rawlsian standard of public reason."' 4
Another reading might move from the general to a more
particular, and sympathetic, appreciation of the dilemma faced by
Mormons who seek public office in a nation in which they are a
distinct minority. As Professor Feldman observes, to outsiders
Mormonism may be seen as presenting an inscrutable juxtaposition
of a "wholesome[,] ... all-American denomination with an idealistic commitment to clean living" with a set of "secret, sacred temple
rites and garments" of seemingly "exaggerated oddity."'4 ' The
point here, obviously, is not to criticize Mormon religious doctrine.
Rather, it is to expose a tension at the heart of the undoubted success of the Latter-day Saints in American society and politics. On
the one hand, the faith's adherents have achieved significant political and social acceptance, only a century after they were harried
across the nation. On the other hand, both for "internal and theological" reasons and for pragmatic reasons borne of the very persecution suffered by Mormons over their history, the church has
maintained an air of "sacred mystery" about many of its practices
and beliefs and has found it politic to "depend[ ] heavily on th[e]
avoidance of public discussion of its religious tenets," to refrain
from talking about "the precise content of Mormon religious beliefs. ,42
This strategy has largely been successful, and was helped
along by "American political norms" that until recently "made religion a taboo subject in polite civil and political society"' ' norms that emerged in part contemporaneously with, and in part
because of, John F. Kennedy's success in convincing voters that he
was a public servant first and a Catholic only second. With the
collapse of the avoidance consensus, Mormons today find them139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Romney, supra note 107.
Griffin, supra note 119, at 500.
Feldman, supra note 133.
Id.
Id.
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selves in a somewhat more difficult position in American civil life.
Religion is now treated as an entirely legitimate subject of public
and political discourse; however, "the combination of secret mysteries and resistance in the face of oppression has made it increasingly difficult for Mormons to talk openly and successfully with
outsiders about their religious beliefs."' 4 Devout Mormon officeholders seeking to command the allegiance of broader political
constituencies thus find themselves in a quandary.
It is easy to sympathize with this dilemma, and one could
understand Romney as offering a reasonable resolution of the
problem. Romney could be saying that he is willing to share his
religious beliefs to the extent that they speak to the broader values
that he shares with the American public, and that only those broader shared values and their impact on his character as a would-be
president are relevant to the discussion. Answering questions
about particular doctrines, by contrast, would serve no purposenot only because Romney and other Mormon politicians should not
be assumed to speak for their faith on complex theological matters,
but also because those doctrines are not immediately relevant to
their character as public servants. Romney's paean to the "great
moral inheritance" of values "we hold in common" suggests he
may have precisely this approach in mind. 45
This is an approach that may satisfy many voters. Moreover, it may offer some solace not only to Mormons but also to all
politicians of a minority faith, whose religious and political values
may be widely shared but not their specific religious beliefs. Certainly it is not hard to sympathize with Romney's desire to convince voters that he is one of them, while seeking to turn the political discussion away from an interrogation of his beliefs on particular questions of doctrine. Ultimately, however, this reading of
Romney's remarks is unpersuasive. His remarks are in reality
more troubling than these sympathetic treatments would suggest.
That is so for two reasons.
First, these friendly readings of Romney's speech are ultimately difficult to square with what Romney actually says and
does in the key portion of the speech quoted above. To be sure,
Romney makes clear that he will not "confuse the particular teachings of [his] church with the obligations of the office [of President]
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
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and of the Constitution."' But neither does he limit the bounds of
acceptable discussion to the nature of his general values, whether
religiously derived or otherwise. Rather, he is at great pains to
answer the "fundamental question" of what he believes about Jesus
Christ-his divinity, his place in the Trinity, and his role for the
future of humanity. 147 This question he impliedly views as a fitting
"question[ ] regarding an aspiring candidate's religion."' 48 More
than that, he deems it "fundamental" to the public discussion of his
fitness for office. He does not suggest that a belief in the divinity
of Jesus is necessary for a public servant, and his speech later indicates that he would deny any such requirement; but he appears to
believe that it is essential to the voters' understanding and approval
of Romney himself. Thus, this is not simply a case of Romney
being unwilling to veil his religious beliefs, or of his mentioning
his faith as one among many clues to his character; rather, he treats
the question of his faith as a vital one. Only then does he rule offlimits further questions about the particulars of his beliefs. Not
coincidentally, perhaps, it is those very particulars that might cause
some Christians to doubt that his theology, or his views concerning
the provenance of
Jesus, are in fact consistent with mainstream
149
Christian beliefs.

It seems, then, that Feldman's criticism is ultimately true.
By invoking specific doctrines about Jesus and treating them as
"fundamental" to his candidacy, Romney puts not just his values,
but his theology, at issue, while attempting to argue simultaneously
that his theology is beside the point. That is an uncomfortable
combination, to say the least. Nor will it do to invoke the Religious Test Clause, as Romney does.5 Whatever formal tests the
Religious Test Clause forbids, it surely does not forbid voters from
asking about--or candidates from discussing (or refusing to discuss)-a candidate's religious beliefs before any vote is cast."'
That is especially true where, as in this case, the candidate himself
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Feldman, supra note 133.
See Romney, supra note 107 ("There are some who would have a

presidential candidate describe and explain his church's distinctive doctrines.
To do so would enable the very religious test the founders prohibited in the Con-

stitution.").
151.

See generally Horwitz, supra note 4.
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puts those religious beliefs at issue, as Romney does by treating his
belief in the divinity of Jesus as an electoral calling card. If it is
consistent with the Religious Test Clause for Romney to raise this
point, and to call it fundamental,5 2 it can hardly be a violation for a
voter to challenge its bona fides.
Second, I am concerned about what Romney's approach,
understandable as it is, ultimately says about the relationship between religion and politics, and especially what it says about religion itself. This sort of approach is illustrated by a press release
circulated by a religious liberty group during the controversy over
the propriety of public discussion of the Catholic faith of thenSupreme Court nominee John Roberts. The letter, which drew
substantially on the Religious Test Clause, concluded as follows:
To be sure, not every mention of religion is improper. Religion, like ethnicity or race, is a natural part
of one's background and may be referred to as naturally-and as respectfully-as those other things
are... . But using fervent religious faith, of any
tradition, as itself a153disqualification for public office
is unconstitutional.
It is this combination, the view that religion belongs in public and
political discourse, but only if it is referred to "respectfully," that
religious believers should ultimately find disturbing, whatever surface attractions it may hold. To suggest .that only "any nonanodyne, critical mention of religion is impermissible," while general invocations of faith not subject to any probing or criticism are
acceptable, "is only a seeming show of respect [for religion]; it is
not genuine respect."'
152.

See Levinson, supra note 76, at 294.
It is one thing to raise questions about religion with nominees
who have not acted to make religious commitments germane
to understanding their performance of their public roles. It is
another to ask someone who has made public profession of the
importance of his or her religion what precisely was the meaning of those professions.

Id.
153.
Letter from Kevin J. "Seamus" Hasson, Chairman, Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, to U.S. Senators (Sept. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.becketfund.org/files/c5222.pdf.
154.
Horwitz, supra note 4, at 142.
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If anything, this rule of dialogue amounts to condescension
rather than genuine respect. If religion is to be welcome in the
public square, it must be welcomed on equal terms with other public concerns, and subjected to the same rules of critical dialogue.
Public office-seekers may choose not to mention their religion at
all, and may refuse to answer any questions on the subject. That is
certainly their right, although they cannot argue that they are compelled by any rules of public discourse to do so. They may also
attempt to limit their discussion to broad generalities about the
contribution that religion has made to their values, while avoiding
any deeper discussion, as Professor Griffin seems to suggest. This
may or may not succeed, and voters are not prohibited from probing deeper. It is important to note, however, that this approach
does not foreclose the possibility that voters will reject these values, and thus reject the candidate himself. If citizens genuinely
value the importance of religion and religious truth (or at least the
possibility of religious truth), and if they share with Romney the
view that one's subscription to a particular faith or doctrine, such
as the divinity of Jesus, is "fundamental" to understanding and
supporting an issue or a candidate, then a more detailed, probing,
and even critical public discourse about a candidate's faith must
remain a possibility.
Kennedy's strategy of avoidance, we have seen, paid too
high a price on behalf of other political candidates by allowing
anyone to seek public office, but only after treating religion as a
private matter for candidates and voters alike. Romney takes a
step beyond this, but the price he pays to reverse the privatization
trend is also too dear. It is a strategy of inclusion without engagement. It permits candidates to mention religion while limiting that
discussion to the vaguest generalities and treating any meaningful,
let alone critical, discussion of religion and particular religious
beliefs as out of bounds. It is a version of religion and religiosity
as-pardon the pun-good enough for government work.
The phrase "good enough for government work" speaks to
Romney's remarks in two senses. First, by invoking his belief in
the divinity of Christ as fundamental to his character and as an acceptable question to ask of him, Romney suggests that he is at least
religious enough to do the job of President, a statement that by implication questions whether people who stand outside the JudeoChristian tradition would be fit for the office. Second, his remarks
suggest that religious beliefs that suit a candidate for public service-that literally are good enough for government work-are of
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necessity fairly vague and airy concoctions, stripped of doctrine
and reduced to little more than a generalized set of values and perhaps a brief profession of belief in Christ. Religion is made public
again. But its public status comes at the cost of making it insipid.
Something of this spirit is evident in Romney's hymn to the diversity of American faith. He writes of "the profound ceremony of
the Catholic Mass, the approachability of God in the prayers of the
Evangelicals, the tenderness of spirit among the Pentecostals, the
confident independence of the Lutherans, the ancient traditions of
the Jews, unchanged through the ages, and the commitment to frequent prayer of the Muslims."'55
This is pleasant language, but we would do better to reject
the flattery. Far from suggesting the meaningful and nuanced differences in faith that both unite and divide the nation in a vibrant
religiously pluralistic society, the passage reads like an excerpt
56
from a milquetoast's guidebook to faith, "Let's Go Religion.'
Although Romney allows for public religious dialogue, it is a rather unsatisfying dialogue. It wants to flatter everyone equally,
always keeping in mind the restrictions he would impose on meaningful discussion, rather than to allow Americans to meaningfully
and critically examine both their commonalities and their differences and to evaluate how those differences might affect a candidate or a voter's approach to politics and public office. For those
who hope that religion, for all the divisiveness it may contribute to
public dialogue, can also be a source of passion and revelation in
public dialogue, surely it is better to welcome the risk of criticism
for particular religious beliefs, particularly if some of those criticisms are valid and perspicuous, than to defend against them with a
shield of well-meaning blandness and generality.'57
155.
Id.
156.
Roger Cohen refers to the passage as displaying "a Wikipedia-level
appreciation of other religions." Cohen, supra note 112. David Brooks observes:
In rallying the armies of faith against their supposed enemies,
Romney waved away any theological distinctions among them
with the brush of his hand ....
In Romney's account, faith
ends up as wishy-washy as the most New Age-y secularism
.... In order to build a voting majority of the faithful, Romney covered over different and difficult conceptions of the
Almighty.
Brooks, supra note 115.
157.
See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 146.
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In sum, Romney's strategy is one of inclusion without
meaningful engagement. It allows religion back into the public
square, but only a decidedly tame version of religion. And, for
reasons that may be peculiar to Romney's own dilemma as a
Mormon in public life, he imposes a rule of dialogue-religious
sentiment is permissible so long as it is general, and a candidate
can profess a particular faith but need not answer any more precise
questions about what that faith entails-that is no dialogue at all.
It is a step up from Kennedy's strategy of avoidance, but it is too
small a step.
Romney's speech goes on to address a further issue: the
content of church-state doctrine. Recall that Kennedy wrote of his
vision of an "America where the separation of church and state is
absolute."'' 8 By contrast, Romney writes that while Americans
separate church and state
for good reason ....
in recent years, the notion of
the separation of church and state has been taken by
some well beyond its original meaning. They seek
to remove from the public domain any acknowledgement of God. Religion is seen as merely a private
affair with no place in public life. It is as if they are
intent on establishing a new religion in Americathe religion of secularism. They are wrong. The
founders proscribed the establishment of a state religion, but they did not countenance the elimination
of religion from the public square.'"
Romney concludes on this basis that "[w]e should acknowledge
the Creator as did the founders-in ceremony and word. He
should remain on our currency, in our pledge, in the teaching of
our history, and during the holiday season, nativity scenes and menorahs should be welcome in our public places." ' 6
Romney here engages in a mistake that is all too common
in public discussion of the role of religion in American public and
political life. He decries, quite rightly, the privatization of religion
that characterized Kennedy's own speech. Romney, however, con158.
159.
160.

BALMER, supra note 29, at 176.
Romney, supra note 107.
Id.
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flates several subtle but distinct aspects of religion and public life.
First, he confuses the statements of private actors within the public
square with the actions of official actors within the public sphere.
Second, and likewise, he confuses the question of whether religious citizens, office-holders, and arguments should be welcome in
the public square with the question of whether there are any limits
on the kinds of things government itself may do officially to advance or acknowledge (or inhibit) religion.
It is one thing to say that religion should be welcome in
public dialogue by private citizens: that everyone who wishes to
speak in public should be able to say nearly everything in public,
that the public square is as open to religious sentiments and displays as it is to non-religious statements and displays. In that
sense, Romney is right. It is another thing to say, however, that the
public sphere-the realm of specifically governmental, and not
private, speech-is and must be acknowledged to be God's sphere.
There is a crucial difference between arguing that private citizens
should be allowed to place "nativity scenes and menorahs . . . in
our public spaces,"'' 6' and arguing that government itself may speak
in a religious voice in the public
' 62 sphere by invoking God "on our
currency [and] in our pledge.'
Whatever the precise contours of the Establishment Clause
may be, there is a difference between arguing that everyone, including religious individuals, must be allowed to participate in
public debate and arguing that government may make particular
religious statements. While the public square may indeed be open
to religious statements by citizens, government itself may well be
forbidden to take sides on these very issues.16 ' As long as vigorous
private speech remains a part of the public square, nothing in this
approach establishes a "religion of secularism." To be clear, Romney is no antidisestablishmentarian.
Neither, however, has he
161.
Id.; see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995); Chabad of S. Ohio & Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2004).
162.
Romney, supra note 107.
163.
See, e.g., Knights of Columbus, Council No. 94 v. Town of Lexington, 272 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2001) ("Although the Constitution protects private
expressions of beliefs, it does not authorize-and sometimes even forbidscitizens' attempts to invoke public backing of their beliefs.").
164.
See Romney, supra note 107 ("The establishment of state religions in
Europe did no favor to Europe's churches.").
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thought carefully enough about the subtle distinctions between
private speech in the public square and speech by government itself and how these ought to affect the proper bounds of church and
state.
Romney concludes by praising the religious diversity of the
nation "and the vibrancy of our religious dialogue.' ' 165 He offers up
an anecdote from the First Continental Congress, in which, amidst
the squabbles of the delegates about the possibility of prayer in a
group containing a multitude of sects, Sam Adams "rose, and said
he would hear a prayer from anyone of piety and good character,
as long as they were a patriot."' 6 It is fitting that his invocation of
Adams echoes President Eisenhower's comment that "[o]ur form
of government has no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt
religious faith[,] and I don't care what it is.' 17 Elsewhere, Romney
has echoed Eisenhower even more directly, asserting that "the
American people want to see a person of faith lead the nation, and
people care very deeply about which
I don't think the American
168
is.'
that
faith
of
brand
These words exemplify Romney's approach of inclusion
without engagement and underscore what is ultimately both unsatisfying and impossible about his approach. Romney seeks to turn
back the clock on Kennedy's strategy of avoidance and privatization of religion, and he would set the clock precisely to the nonspecific public religiosity of the Eisenhower era. His speech ultimately argues, if not in so many words, for the proposition that
"the American people want to see a person of faith lead the nation,
and he offers them just enough evidence to assure them
that he is a sufficiently devoted and devotional man for public office. However, it is just as important for Romney to establish that
"the American people [do not] care very deeply about which brand
of faith that is,"' 7 not because that is true, although it may be, but
because his political success depends on its being true. As a result,
Romney offers a mix of religion and American politics that allows
religion onto the public stage but denies it full speaking status.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
SMITH, supra note 18, at 254.
Griffin, supra note 119, at 499 (quoting Bluey, supra note 135).
Id.
Id.
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Religion is there to nod, smile, and wave, but not to speak meaningfully or be spoken to in kind.
For those who truly value religion as a powerful wellspring
of human experience and social change, that status is not enough.
It is better for religious individuals to be able to participate fully,
vigorously, and vocally in public life; but that entails accepting
inquiry and criticism, not just bland praise. Ultimately, accepting
critical dialogue on questions of religion is not just a small price to
pay. A critical, and sometimes unkind, engagement with religion
is ultimately the truest expression of respect for religion's role in
the public square."'
Moreover, the sentimental journey that Romney's strategy
of inclusion without engagement represents is not just unsatisfying.
It is also unattainable. It is wishful thinking to believe that one
may turn the clock back to the Eisenhower era. American religiosity is not the same as it was in the 1950s, and neither is the social
consensus surrounding religiosity. Society is both more religiously
vigorous and enthusiastic than it was then, and more splintered and
diverse. Societal views about religion's bedrock social role are not
as uncontroversial as they once were, and even those who assume a
bedrock role for religion may differ vehemently about what that
entails. In a phrase, religion's role in public life is now contested
and contestable. In this environment, a strategy of inclusion without engagement, however well it once may have worked (or
seemed to have worked), is now as impossible as it is unsatisfying.
171.

For a similar argument from an explicitly secular perspective, see

AUSTIN DACEY, THE SECULAR CONSCIENCE: WHY BELIEF BELONGS IN PUBLIC
LIFE (2008).

So long as the reasons we introduce into public discoursereasons of conscience included-are regarded by all as open to
public scrutiny, then the challenge of subjectivity can be grappled with, if not totally eliminated. Ideally, conversation in
politics abides by the norms of all reasoned conversation. Unless we are willing to present others with reasons for what we
say that are open to analysis by them, we are engaging in monologue, not dialogue ....

Honest religious believers have

nothing to lose and much to gain by treating their faith as objective in this sense. Susceptibility to criticism is the price of
admission to serious public life. But it is a price that they
should be willing to pay, for convictions take their strengths
from surviving trials, not from avoiding them. Anything less
would be a trivialization of religion ....
Id. at 51-52.
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Romney fails to see that, if religion is not to be excluded from public life altogether, it can only be included in a spirit of genuine
public engagement--even if it comes at the high, and perhaps unfair, cost of rejecting Romney the candidate.
IV. BARACK OBAMA: ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT (FULL) INCLUSION?

The final candidate whose words on religion and American
politics bear examination needs little introduction right now. As
of this writing, that candidate, Barack Obama, is now the President. That alone makes his words worth the attention. Beyond
this, though, Obama's words deserve a close and critical reading
on their own terms, for his is the most thoughtful and careful of the
three speeches examined here, even if not all that he says is right.
Obama offers a rich and meaningful engagement with religion and its role in public life, one that is certainly leagues away
from the strategy of avoidance practiced by Kennedy. In some
respects, however, the flaws in Obama's speech present a mirror
image of the flaws in Romney's speech. Obama too exacts a steep
price for religion's place in public life, demanding that religion
express itself only in terms that may not come naturally to it. We
might think of this as a strategy of engagement without full inclusion. Although Obama's speech is itself a model of the kind of
critical dialogue about religion that should exist in public life, the
constraints he places on religion are themselves untenable, as his
own speech ultimately suggests.
In some ways, Obama enjoyed certain advantages over
Kennedy and Romney with respect to the timing and nature of his
speech. Obama's address at the conference, "Building a Covenant
for a New America," took place on June 28, 2006.12 Obama was
thus still almost a year away from declaring his candidacy for President. The thought of doing so had surely crossed his mind, and so
it can hardly be said that he spoke without an eye to that eventuality. Still, even if he knew what was around the comer, it surely
helped that Obama was still speaking as a Senator and not a presidential candidate. He was not speaking in the midst of the maelstrom that surrounded Kennedy or Romney by the time they adSee Sen. Barack Obama, "Call to Renewal" Keynote Address, June
172.
28, 2006 (transcript available at http://blog.beliefnet.com/stevenwaldman/2008/
11/obamas-historic-call-to-renewal.html).
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dressed their own audiences. Moreover, and unlike both Kennedy
and Romney, Obama's own faith was not at issue in the public eye,
at least at this point in his political career.'73 In this somewhat
more comfortable environment, Obama perhaps felt he could better
afford a greater degree of candor and specificity than either Kennedy or Romney did. The result is a weighty and detailed discus'v
sion of the relationship between religion and political life.
Obama frames his speech at the outset as an effort to
"tackle head-on the mutual suspicion that sometimes exists between religious America and secular America."' 75 He begins by
relating his discomfort at the criticisms he faced in his senatorial
campaign against Republican Alan Keyes, who had said, "Jesus
Christ would not vote for Barack Obama."' 7 6 Obama recalls that
although he offered "the typically liberal response in such debates
...that we live in a pluralistic society, that I can't impose my own
religious views on another, that I was running to be the U.S. Senator of Illinois and not the Minister of Illinois,"'7 7 his response "did
not adequately address the role my faith has in guiding my own
values and my own beliefs."' 78 Obama argues that this debate is a
microcosmic example of "the broader debate we've been having in
this country for the last thirty years over the role of religion in politics."' 17 9

Obama argues that although conservative leaders have effectively managed to talk to voters in religious terms, Democrats
have tried "to avoid the conversation about religious values altogether," either by asserting that they are barred from discussing
them by the Constitution or by "dismiss[ing] religion in the public
173.
Of course, this would change much later in his presidential campaign,
when attention was drawn to the sometimes incendiary rhetoric of his pastor,
Reverend Jeremiah Wright. See, e.g., Jeff Zeleny, Obama Urges U.S. to Grapple With Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at Al (reporting on a speech by
Obama in which he "sought to dispel the furor over inflammatory statements by
his former pastor").
174.
The speech is expanded, although to little additional substantive effect, in Obama's book. See OBAMA, supra note 12, at 213. I will use the speech
rather than the book as my text here.
175.
Obama, supra note 172.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
Id.
178.
Id.
179.
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square as inherently irrational or intolerant.' ' 810 Such "strategies of
avoidance" are a mistake, he argues, because they "fail to acknowledge the power of faith in ...the lives of the American
people."18 ' Instead, he calls for "progressives" to "join a serious
debate about how to reconcile faith with our modem, pluralistic
democracy." 8 '
In response to the strategy of avoidance, Obama offers up
his own conversion narrative.8 3 Beginning with a family background in which a "healthy skepticism of organized religion" was
the norm, he found himself working closely as an adult with Christian churches in Chicago whose values he shared but in which "a
part of [him] remained removed, detached, .. . an observer in their
midst."' He came to feel the lack of a "vessel for [his] beliefs,"
which he ultimately found in the tradition of the historical struggle
of the African-American church. This led him to see faith "as an
active, palpable agent in the world."'8 5 In this spirit, he ultimately
"walk[ed] down the aisle of Trinity United Church of Christ...
8 6
and affirm[ed] [his] Christian faith.' ,
Like most conversion narratives, this one is ultimately not
just about Obama. He seeks to make this an American story, a
story about a nation's "hunger" for something more than the material or the quotidian.'87 His journey, he says, bending his narrative toward the larger ends of his speech, is one that "has been
shared by millions upon millions of Americans--evangelicals,
Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims alike.... It is not something they set apart from the rest of their beliefs and values. In
fact, it is often what drives their beliefs and their values."'88
180.
181.
182.
183.
American

Id.
Id.

Id.

Conversion narratives enjoy a longstanding status as a central trope of
religious speech. See, e.g., PATRICIA CALDWELL, THE PURITAN
CONVERSION NARRATIVE: THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN EXPRESSION (1983);
PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953);
see also D. BRUCE HINDMARSH, THE EVANGELICAL CONVERSION NARRATIVE:
SPIRITUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (2008).

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Obama, supra note 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This is the launching point for Obama's broader argument
that progressives must learn not to "abandon the field of religious
discourse."' 89 On a narrow level, his argument is tactical. Progressives must learn to address citizens in religious terms, lest, by "forfeit[ing] the imagery and terminology through which millions of
Americans understand both their personal morality and social justice," they lose the argument and cede the field to "those with the
most insular views of faith, or those who cynically use religion to
justify partisan ends."'' 9 If progressives abandon their hostility to
religious discourse in public life, they might "recognize some overlapping values that both religious and secular people share when it
comes to the moral and material direction of our country," and
"engage millions of religious Americans in the larger spirit of
American renewal."' 9' Obama also argues, however, that "[ojur
failure as progressives to tap into the moral underpinnings of the
nation is not just rhetorical."'' 92 It also ignores the extent to which
the problems that beset society, and the potential solutions to those
problems, are deeply rooted in spiritual values, and not just a matter for technocrats "in search of the perfect ten point plan."' 93

From this perspective, Obama reaches a number of conclusions. First, he says:
[S]ecularists are wrong when they ask believers to
leave their religion at the door before entering into
the public square. Frederick Douglas, Abraham
Lincoln, William Jennings Bryant, Dorothy Day,
Martin Luther King-indeed, the majority of great
reformers in American history-were not only motivated by faith, but repeatedly used religious language to argue for their cause. So to say that men
and women should not inject their "personal morality" into public policy debates is a practical absurdity. Our law is by definition a codification of moral-

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ity, much of it grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition. 94
Obama argues that the gulf "between religious and secular people
of good will" must be bridged by the hard work of public discussion: "The tensions and the suspicions on each side of the religious
divide will have to be squarely addressed and each side will need
to accept some ground rules for collaboration.'" 9' He sets a number of such conditions.
The first is a recognition of "the critical role that the separation of church and state has played in preserving not only our
democracy, but the robustness of our religious practice." 96 This
role is increasingly important in a nation containing an ever more
diverse array of faiths as well as non-religious citizens. Second,
Qbama argues that "[diemocracy demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather than religionspecific, values. It requires that their proposals be subject to argument, and amenable to reason.' ' 97 He acknowledges that some
faith traditions stress the inerrancy of their views, but responds that
"in a pluralistic democracy, we have no choice" but to act and argue "in accordance with those things that we98 all see, and that we
all hear, be it common laws or basic reason."'
Third, Obama argues that "any reconciliation between faith
and democratic pluralism requires some sense of proportion.' 99
As a practical matter, for religious individuals this means recognizing that politics must "accommodate modem life" and thus is unlikely to achieve by legislation the fulfillment of all of their religious and moral beliefs. 2°° Obama, however, also counsels "a
sense of proportion [for] those who police the boundaries between
church and state." 20' Obama states:
Not every mention of God in public is a breach to
the wall of separation-context matters. It is doubt194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ful that children reciting the Pledge of Allegiance
feel oppressed or brainwashed as a consequence of
muttering the phrase "under God." I didn't. Having voluntary student prayer groups use school
property to meet should not be a threat, any more
than its use by the High School Republicans should
threaten Democrats. And one can envision certain
faith-based programs-targeting ex-offenders or
substance abusers-that offer a uniquely powerful
way of solving problems.' °2
Obama concludes by arguing for the importance of engaging in a thoughtful and good faith dialogue with religious individuals, including those who disagree on various public policy positions, "who are looking for a deeper, fuller conversation about religion in this country. They may not change their positions, but they
are willing to listen and learn from those who are willing to speak
in fair-minded words."20 3 He prays "that we can live with one
another in a way that reconciles the beliefs of each with the good
of all. It's a prayer worth praying, and a conversation worth having in this country in the months and years to come."204
This is a speech that one might think of as characteristically
Obamaesque in both its virtues and its flaws. It is a thoughtful,
rich, and convincing performance, but in some ways it may offer
rather less than meets the eye at first. Although it promises to
"join a serious debate about how to reconcile faith with our modem, pluralistic democracy," 205 it is ultimately as much a political
speech about religion as it is a religious speech about politics. Although it says that the "failure [of] progressives to tap into the
moral underpinnings of the nation is not just rhetorical, 2 '06 certainly much of the speech is as much about being a political progressive, and finding rhetorical ways of reaching other progressives
(particularly those who are religious), as it is about being religious
as such. As Obama acknowledges, part of the point of his speech
is "rhetorical": he does not want the left to cede the field of "imagery and terminology through which millions of Americans un202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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derstand both their personal morality and social justice" to "the
Jerry Falwells and Pat Robertsons and Alan Keyeses" of the
right.2 ' Although he wants progressives to adopt religious rhetoric
on issues of common cause and sees that move as natural, he is
decidedly less charitable to the religious right, which he describes
as having "exploit[ed]" the gap between religious and nonreligious Americans. 28 Still, Obama offers a clearer, more detailed, and more thought-provoking exposition of the relationship
between religion and politics than either Kennedy or Romney before him. If Obama presents a model of engagement between religion and politics, this speech serves as the best possible evidence
of this conclusion, for several reasons.
First, Obama's speech, of the three, offers the richest and
most unflinching description of religious faith itself. Unlike Kennedy, who treats his faith as incidental, or Romney, who treats it as
central but offers no meaningful particulars, Obama describes a
life-world in which faith plays a central part. In his depiction, faith
is not simply a "bland, smiley-faced" phenomenon that "cover[s]
over different and difficult conceptions of the Almighty." 2° To the
contrary, it is a "hunger" for something more than "nothingness." ' 0
Nor is Obama's faith simply an easily satiating, if unsatisfying, bit
of pabulum. Obama acknowledges that "[f]aith doesn't mean that
you don't have doubts," that it is part of a fully human and sinful
life, and that, even with "God's spirit beckoning [him]," faith did
not mean that "[t]he questions [he] had . . . magically disappear[ed].,, 211 This is surely a far more fully realized description of
the religious experience than anything offered up in the speeches
already examined, and that very fact exhibits a significant level of
public engagement between a political office-holder and religion.
Obama's speech also represents a fuller level of engagement between religion and politics on the political side of the ledger. Rather than simply enlist on one side of the culture war to
build a "voting majority of the faithful" or the faithless, 2 Obama
emphasizes the importance of engagement on both sides: the need
to "tackle head-on the mutual suspicion that sometimes exists be207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Brooks, supra note 115.
Obama, supra note 172.
Id.
Brooks, supra note 115.
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tween" both "religious America and secular America., 21'3 He
makes clear that political progressives should not "shy away from
religious venues and religious broadcasts because we assume we
will be unwelcome," thus suggesting that public officials should
engage in dialogue within the religious sphere and not simply on
the more secular or ecumenical public stage.14
Most importantly, Obama rejects Kennedy's characterization of faith as distinct from politics and public life. He refuses to
accept any characterization of issues of social justice as being "not
religious issues. 2t 5 Instead, he argues that "values and culture," by
which he clearly means religious values and culture, play an
integral role in questions of public policy. 2 6 Although he rhymes
off a list of standard progressive positions on various public policy
issues such as gun control, poverty, education, and so on, in each
case he believes religion makes a distinct contribution to understanding and resolving those issues. 2 7 Echoing Martin Buber, Obama sees in each of these issues a distinctly religious calling "to
think in terms of 'thou' and not just '.,,, 211 Indeed, he recognizes
not only that religious values may enter into the public sphere, but
that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. "[T]o say that men and
women should not inject their 'personal morality' into public policy debates is a practical absurdity. ' 2 9 Although he briefly attempts
to justify some level of church-state separation, he does so on explicitly religious grounds rather than secular ones. 220 Given these
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
1970).
219.
220.

Obama, supra note 172.
Id.
BALMER, supra note 29, at 176.
Obama, supra note 172.
See id.
Id.; see MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed.
Obama, supra note 172.
See id.
Folks tend to forget that during our founding, it wasn't the
atheists or the civil libertarians who were the most effective
champions of the First Amendment. It was the persecuted minorities. It was Baptists like John Leland who didn't want the
established churches to impose their view on folks who were
getting happy out in the fields and teaching the scripture to
slaves. It was the forebears of the evangelicals who were most
adamant about not mingling government with religio[n], because they did not want state-sponsored religion hindering
their ability to practice their faith as they understood it.
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views, Obama can hardly conclude otherwise than he does-that
"secularists are wrong when they ask believers to leave their reli221
gion at the door before entering into the public square.,
Perhaps because Obama's view of religion's role in public
life is so rich and nuanced, and because it is not simply an effort to
use religion to corral together a voting majority, as David Brooks
argues was Romney's intent,222 Obama also makes a more natural
place for the non-religious in describing religion's role in the public square. Rejecting the suggestion that "every progressive suddenly latch on to religious terminology," he says, "I would rather
have someone who is grounded in morality and ethics, and who is
also secular, affirm their morality and ethics and values without
pretending that they're something they're not.... None of us need
to do that." 223 This is arguably a more persuasive and inclusive use
of common "American values" than Romney' S224 whose speech
hints that the truest and most trustworthy American values are specifically religious (and perhaps "Judeo-Christian") ones. Because
Obama unabashedly acknowledges the centrality of religion to his
own moral values, and the broader connection between religion
and morality for most citizens, he is free to suggest that nonreligious citizens can be equally decent and valuable voters and
public office-holders.
In short, Obama's speech offers a model of political engagement in the religious sphere, and religious engagement in the
public sphere. It is a decided step away from Kennedy's strategy
of avoidance, and a more meaningful version of engagement than
the somewhat pallid one offered by Romney. But is this an inclusive form of engagement? Even if Obama's speech itself engages
with religion in a thoughtful way, do the rules he prescribes in his
2
quest to "reconcile faith with our modem, pluralistic democracy 25
allow for the genuine inclusion of religious citizens in public life?
Recall Obama's argument that "[d]emocracy demands that the religiously motivated translate their concerns into universal, rather
than religion-specific, values. It requires that their proposals be
Id.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Brooks, supra note 115.
Obama, supra note 172.
See supra Griffin, supra note 119; notes 120-124 and accompanying

text.
225.

Obama, supra note 172.
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subject to argument, and amenable to reason. 226 He says that "in a
pluralistic democracy, we have no choice" but to act and argue "in
accordance with those things that we all see, and that we all hear,
' This is an entirely common
be it common laws or basic reason."227
8
move in liberal theory. In particular, it has been associated with
John Rawls's argument for the primacy of public reason in political argument.229 It suggests that it is at best imprudent, and at worst
morally impermissible, for public arguments to be voiced in religious terms. 230
In some versions of this argument, religious individuals
may raise religious arguments in public, but their reasons cannot
be exclusively religious; they must also be accompanied by publicly accessible reasons.' Obama's version appears to be even stricter than that. It demands absolute translation of religious arguments into publicly accessible language rather than simply requiring religious reasons to be joined with publicly accessible ones. In
dropping Rawls's "proviso" that religious reasons "may be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course
public reasons.. . are presented sufficient to support whatever the
comprehensive [religious] doctrines are introduced to support, 232
Obama outdoes Rawls himself.
Id.
226.
Id. (emphasis added).
227.
See Griffin, supra note 119, at 495 (noting that Obama's language
228.
"appears to be consistent with the ideals of many liberal theorists who have
argued that appeals to religion in politics should be 'publicly accessible' or
'publicly justifiable,' stated in terms of 'public reason' or 'secular reason,' in the
language of universal values instead of sectarian beliefs"). Griffin goes on to
suggest, however, that Obama in fact does not reflect the Rawlsian liberal tradition, but ultimately smuggles in his religious positions through secular language.
I address Griffin's views in more detail below. See infra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L.
229.
REV. 756 (1997).
See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 64-66 (2004)
230.
(summarizing and critiquing Rawls's position).
See id. (characterizing Rawls as having shifted from the stricter to the
231.
more permissive restriction on religious arguments); see also KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); KENT

GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988).
232.

See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM li-lii (paperback ed. 1996);

Rawls, supra note 229, at 756.
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What should we make of these remarks? Consider the view
offered by Professor Leslie Griffin. Griffin perceptively observes
a tension between Obama's demand that religious individuals
translate their arguments into publicly accessible terms and what
he says elsewhere. In The Audacity of Hope, Obama relates a discussion with a lesbian supporter who is disappointed that he has
"referred to his religious beliefs in order to explain his opposition
to gay marriage but not civil unions." '33 Griffin notes that Obama
is led as a result of this conversation to "reflect more deeply, not
on common values, but about his Christian faith," suggesting that
rather than translate his own concerns into universal values, Obama "turned for insight to the teaching
of his own faith about a
'2
contested moral and legal question. 14
Griffin uses this passage to argue that Obama is ultimately
not Rawlsian enough. Obama, she argues, "violate[s] the standard
of public reason., 235 Even translation "merely hides [the problem],
leaving politicians to govern according to religious beliefs as long
as they discover a secular rationale . . . for governmental action.2 36
She would prefer that politicians "employ public reason as the
starting point," not only for their public arguments but 2also
for
37
politics.
and
law
of
matters
on
their very "decision-making
My objection is the reverse of Griffin's. Although Obama's speech itself exemplifies what one might hope for in an
ideal world of engagement between religion and politics, the rule
he sets forth for public dialogue is not a genuinely inclusive one.
As the price of political participation for religious individuals, they
are required to put their arguments in a language that may be alien
to them. 38 Such a requirement, as Jeffrey Stout notes, is "counterintuitive, given that it seems so contrary to the spirit of free expression that breathes life into democratic culture., 239 This requirement of translation is neither particularly helpful nor especially fair. The hot-button example of abortion may provide an example. Obama says:
233.

See

234.

Griffin, supra note 119, at 495.

OBAMA,

supra note 12, at 223; Griffim, supra note 119, at 495.

235.
Id. at 499.
236. Id. at 502.
237.
Id.; see generally Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian
Liberals,5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297 (1997).
238.
See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 230, at 72 (citations ommitted).
239.
Id. at 68.
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I may be opposed to abortion for religious reasons,
but if I seek to pass a law banning the practice, I
cannot simply point to the teachings of my church
or evoke God's will. I have to explain why abortion
violates some principle that is accessible to people
of all faiths, including those with no faith at all.2 °
Now, doubtless it is true as a practical matter that a strictly religious argument for the banning of abortion is less likely to gamer
substantial political support than an argument that buttresses religious arguments with broader "accessible" reasons that will appeal
to a wider constituency. This does not demonstrate, however, that
one is obliged to point to these wider reasons.
Moreover, at some level, and particularly on "especially intractable political questions" such as abortion, "[efveryone holds
some beliefs on nonreligious topics without claiming to know that
they are true."24 ' Whether the abortion debate should rest on the
potential life of the fetus, the moral gravity of abortion, the autonomy of the mother, or some other grounds such as privacy or the
limited domain of the state, does not depend on reasons that are
subject to reasoned debate past a certain, fairly shallow point.
These questions are subject to what Justice Holmes famously
called his "can't helps," 242 even if explicitly religious reasons are
set to one side. They are the sorts of issues about which one is
likely to be "unable to produce an argument that would give
[one's] interlocutors reason to accept [one's] premises. ' 243 Itmay
be that few, if any, of our "most deeply engrained commitments,"'2 secular or religious, are truly and absolutely universal,
subject to argument, or amenable to reason. Even if they were, the
question for many would remain why this should be the default
rule, and not some other default. As a practical matter, however, it
is unlikely that many have ready access to those reasons, even if
they can be said to exist.
Obama, supra note 172.
240.
STOUT, supra note 230, at 87 (emphasis added).
241.
See Benjamin Kaplan, Encounters With O.W. Holmes, 96 HARv. L.
242.
REv. 1828, 1850 (1983); see also ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 23-27 (2000);
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Ideals and Doubts, 10 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1915).
STOUT, supra note 230, at 87.
243.
Id.
244.
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Thus, contra Obama, it is unreasonable and unfair to demand that religious reasons be translated into publicly accessible
language. That does not mean that religious individuals may not
choose to use publicly accessible language, whether on its own or
in combination with religious language. They may do so for politically pragmatic reasons, or because they think those publicly accessible arguments are good arguments that they too find persuasive. But this is not an obligation. It certainly should not apply to
religious individuals in particular any more than it should apply to
holders of any other "can't help" moral or political beliefs.2 45 Citizens are not required to be Rawlsian liberals, even if doing so
would help them win more political battles. To the contrary, as
Nicholas Wolterstorff observes, it violates the norms of liberal democracy for "citizens to be morally constrained from deciding and
discussing political issues as they see fit." 246
Obama might respond that "in a pluralistic democracy, we
have no [other] choice ' 247 than to impose a rule of translation. But
there are other choices. At least two writers have offered thoughtful alternatives to the rule that Obama proposes. Michael Perry
offers a somewhat more restrictive version, although it is certainly
far more permissive than Obama's translation requirement.m He
proposes a model of "ecumenical politics," in which religious individuals are free to "rely on [their] convictions, not only in making
political choices, but in publicly deliberating about and in publicly
discussing them." 249 Yet he expects religious individuals to engage
in dialogue in the public square in a spirit of "fallibilism and pluralism., 250 That is, they should "accept[ ] the 'ideal of self-critical
rationality,' the relentless scrutiny of one's own beliefs and the
245.
For a short but incisive take on this question, see Christopher J.
Eberle, Religious Reasons in Public: Let A Thousand Flowers Bloom, But Be
Preparedto Prune, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 431 (2007).
246. NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF & ROBERT AUDI, RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC
SQUARE: THE PLACE OF RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS IN POLITICAL DEBATE 94
(1997) (emphasis omitted).
247.
Obama, supra note 172.
248.

See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION

AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). For an insightful review, see
Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 2061 (1992).
249.
PERRY, supra note 248, at 112.
250. Id. at 100.
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acknowledgement that they are subject to revision,"' ' and they
should admit the possibility of learning from people of other religious and moral backgrounds.f 2
Perry's approach is certainly capable of criticism. "' His
approach, however, is more welcoming than Obama's. It allows
religious arguments into the public square unfettered by any absolute requirement of public reason, although it suggests that religious citizens must be prepared to be self-critical when they engage in public argument. This is a step up from translation, even if
it is an insufficient one.
Jeffrey Stout offers an even more admirable picture of religious participation in public life in his recent book Democracy and
Tradition.2 Although it is perhaps more of a rejection of the
Rawlsian rule of public reason2 55 than a programmatic description
of the relationship between religion and politics, it nevertheless
offers an illuminating picture of how dialogue might take place in
a liberal democracy among people who do not share common premises.
The key to Stout's picture of dialogue in these circumstances is "immanent criticism," an approach in which individuals
"either try to show that their opponents' religious views are incoherent, or ... try to argue positively from their opponents' religious premises to the conclusion that the proposal is acceptable.
What they do not do is argue from a purportedly common basis of
reasons in Rawls's sense. ' ' 21 6 His vision of dialogue as immanent

251.

Levinson, supra note 248, at 2069 (quoting PERRY, supra note 248, at

100).
252. See PERRY, supra note 248, at 100.
253. See Levinson, supra note 248, at 2073-74 (arguing that these requirements would exclude many religious individuals from public dialogue);
David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern
America: A Response to ProfessorPerry, 76 IOWA L. REv. 1067 (1991) (same).
254. See STOUT, supra note 230. For an article that focuses on somewhat
different aspects of the book, see Marci A. Hamilton, What Does "Religion"
Mean in the Public Square?,89 MINN. L. REv. 1153 (2005).
255. See Franklin I. Gamwell, The Question of Democracy, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 997, 1006 (2008) (situating Stout as presenting "a decided alternative to
Rawlsian liberalism" but arguing that their approaches share in common the
assumption "that democracy itself neither has nor requires any moral ground
beyond the principles of presuppositions located in its own historicity").
256. STOUT, supra note 230, at 69 (emphasis added).
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criticism is decidedly conversational. 7 A discussant who cites
religious views against an opponent will "draw [her interlocutor]
into a Socratic conversation on the matter, take seriously the objections [raised] against [her] premises, and make a concerted attempt
to show ...how [the interlocutor's] idiosyncratic premises give
[the interlocutor] reason to accept [her] conclusions."'25' One can
thus "express[ ] one's own" religious "reasons for a political policy
while also directing fair-minded, nonmanipulative, sincere immanent criticism against one's opponent's reasons," and vice versa.259
Of course, not many political conversations begin as "Socratic conversation[s]," and fewer still end that way. Moreover, it
may seem that "immanent criticism" is just another way of packaging Perry's requirement of fallibilism. However, Stout's vision of
dialogue as immanent criticism is not as impractical as others.
Many citizens, whether they are making religious arguments or
not, engage in at least some form of discussion in the public
square, and it is not too much to expect them to listen to and engage each other's premises when they do. In any event, political
dialogue regularly takes place around premises that the discussants
cannot fully justify or describe. Thus, immanent criticism is no
more impractical where religious premises are concerned than
where purportedly non-religious premises such as autonomy are
involved.
Moreover, Stout's vision has two great virtues. First, it is
more genuinely respectful of religion and its role in the public
square and in individuals' lives than a rule of translation. 260 Immanent criticism does not require that one accept another's religious
(or non-religious) premises or abandon one's own. It simply asks
that one listen and respond to those premises, treating them as entry points into a deeper and more meaningful conversation. There
is nothing disrespectful about this. To the contrary, it respects the
257.
In a thoughtful article, Marc DeGirolami, drawing on the work of
Michael Oakeshott, explores and extends the metaphor of a conversation in considering the role of religion in public education. See Marc 0. DeGirolami, The
Problemof Religious Learning, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1213 (2008).
258.
STOUT, supra note 230, at 72.
259.
Id. at 85, 88 (recommending an approach in which one "express[es]
[one's] actual (religious) reasons for supporting [a] policy... while also engaging in immanent criticisms of [one's] opponents' views").
260.
On the importance of genuine respect in framing the dialogue between religion and politics, see Horwitz, supra note 4, at 141-43.
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very fact that people may hold to these comprehensive convictions
more deeply than they do to particular publicly accessible reasons.

261

Second, and contrary to the arguments of Richard Rorty,
the inclusion of religious premises in political conversation
through a model of immanent criticism is not a "conversationstopper."2 62 As Stout observes, religion is, at the least, no more of a
conversation-stopper than anything else. All manner of purportedly publicly accessible reasons on matters of political controversy
approach the status of "faith-claim[s]," inasmuch as they are "beliefs on nonreligious topics" that one holds "without claiming to
know that they are true.2 63 Moreover, even when religious reasons
"lead to a momentary impasse" in conversation, that need not be
the end of the dialogue. 2 "One can always back up a few paces,
and begin again, now with a broader conversational objective" and
expressing one's reasons "in greater detail., 26' By contrast, a rule
that demands translation, either as an absolute rule (as Obama's
speech appears to suggest) or as an accompaniment to religious
reasons (as Rawls's proviso suggests), ultimately reaches a point at
which the religious individual must either reach for language he 2or66
she considers false or unpersuasive, or dissemble, or fall silent.
Such a policy, compared to the candid approach of immanent criticism, "would itself be a conversation-stopper." 26
It is thus possible to construct a rule of dialogue between
religion and politics that is far preferable to, if messier than, Obama's rule of translation. In a pluralistic democracy, there is
another choice-a regime of both engagement and inclusion. In
this regime, the starting presumption is that political speech about
religion, and religiously premised debate about politics, should be
the same as political speech in general: "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open," in the Supreme Court's classic formulation.268 One
can presume that religion is an open subject for political debate,
261.
262.

See STOUT, supra note 230, at 72.
See RICHARD RORTY, Religion As
PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 168 (1999).
263.
STOUT, supra note 230, at 87.

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Conversation-Stopper, in

Id. at 90.
Id.
See id. at 90-91.
Id. at 90.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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and religious premises can be presumed to be valid premises for
public argument. Contrary to Obama's approach, which engages
religion but prescribes a rule of translation that amounts to noninclusion of those who are unwilling to phrase their reasons in publicly accessible terms, no one need reach for publicly accessible
terms. One may adopt and argue from any premises one wishes,
but those religious premises are themselves always open to criticism-both self-criticism, as in Perry's description of fallibilism,
and the criticism of others.
Sometimes these engagements will be productive and
sometimes they will not. On occasion, a religious premise may
illuminate conversation on a matter of public concern, even for
those who do not share that premise. On other occasions, a person
holding out a religious justification for a particular policy can be
engaged on the question of how his argument applies to other policies, as when one examines religious arguments against abortion
for consistency with policies such as the death penalty, or social
policies that arguably favor the conditions of life, such as basic
health or welfare policies. 69 Of course, one may simply reject a
particular religious premise from an external perspective. Even
here, though, the result is not necessarily a stopped conversation.
Rather, the participants in such a debate can arrive at a sharpened
realization of the basis for their differences with each other. Sometimes that may lead to convergence on the points on which they
agree, albeit for different reasons.2 0 At other times, it may lead to
a clarified understanding of their "can't helps," and a mutually respectful standoff.
Of course, one can readily imagine a far more uncharitable
and far less productive conversation. But there are possible responses to this as well. One can try to come up with general rules
of "etiquette" that might help channel and improve political dialogue about and stemming from religious premises.'
On the other
269.
See, e.g., OBAMA, supra note 12, at 221 ("In judging the persuasiveness of various moral claims, we should be on the lookout for inconsistency in
how such claims are applied.").
270.
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL
CONFLICT (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
HARV. L. REv. 1733 (1995).
271.
For one such attempt, see Horwitz, supra note 4, at 133-44. See also
STOUT, supra note 230, at 85; RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION INPUBLIC LIFE:
A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996).
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hand, one can simply exercise the right not to participate in political dialogue when it involves religious issues. Romney took this
approach, although his speech makes apparent that, perhaps for
strategic reasons, he also wished to argue that it was wrong for his
critics even to ask detailed questions about his faith and its implications. He wanted to have the benefits, but not the costs, of an
inclusive regime.
Finally, a few words are in order about Obama's discussion
of church-state doctrine, which somewhat parallels Romney's own
remarks on the subject. Obama argues that "any reconciliation
between faith and democratic pluralism requires some sense of
proportion" on both sides of the religious/secular divide.272 Obama
errs on both sides of the divide.
First, Obama argues that Americans are "intuitively" wise
in understanding that some religious premises "may be modified to
accommodate modem life," as in the case of "Catholics [who]
practice birth control" or "some of those opposed to gay marriage
[who] nevertheless are opposed to a Constitutional amendment to
'
ban it."273
Obama says that religious leaders "need not accept such
wisdom in counseling their flocks, but they should recognize this
wisdom in their politics. 2 74 Obama is right, both as a matter of
pragmatic politics and for deeper reasons, that not every religious
individual should assume that the state should decisively resolve
every issue in her favor. Some issues should be left for resolution
to the political process or should remain permanently up for
grabs-either because individual rights demand it or because the
state's limited domain does not reach far enough to force an authoritative resolution of the matter. For some individuals, gay marriage is certainly one such question; for others, abortion may be.
These conclusions, however, do not say anything important
about "proportionality" in the sense that Obama seems to mean it.
To be sure, those who hold strong religious convictions must direct
their intellects and consciences to the difficult question of how
their views should translate into policy conclusions in particular
contexts. It is certainly not the case, however, that "proportionality" means that a religious individual is required to modify or water
down his strongly held religious views simply because of the need
272.
273.
274.

Obaina, supra note 172.
OBAMA, supra note 12, at 220-21.
Id.
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to "accommodate modem life." If one in fact concludes, after
careful deliberation, that one's religious views on a particular matter are inflexible, one need not modify those views. A Catholic
voter might conclude that the state should not absolutely bar the
availability of birth control, either because it violates the Constitution or because any leviathan state with the power to do so could
just as well abuse this power in the future. But it would hardly be
disproportionate for her to retain her own belief in the wrongness
of birth control, and to refuse to accommodate her own practices to
"modem life." "A sense of proportion" is largely irrelevant to such
questions.
Obama adds that "a sense of proportion should also guide
those who police the boundaries between church and state. 275 In
saying so, he appears to commit a species of Romney's error. He
conflates a policy of public engagement by citizens, in which religious voters and officials need not check their beliefs at the door of
the public square, with the question of what sorts of government
actions are themselves permissible or impermissible in such a regime. He is surely right that "[n]ot every mention of God in public
is a breach to the wall of separation. 27 6 Obama is also right in most
of the positions he takes on the particular constitutional questions
that he brings up. The use of public property by "voluntary student prayer groups" and the opening of public funds on an equal
basis to "certain faith-based programs" are not constitutionally
impermissible, and may in fact be a consequence of a larger regime
of engagement and inclusion.277
275.
Id.
276.
Id.
277.
Id. Note, however, that even here Obama is not fully inclusive. His
proposal for the support of faith-based social services along with similar secular
programs, voiced later in the campaign, would, for example, limit the ability of
such programs to discriminate against "the people [they] hire." Jeff Zeleny &
Michael Luo, Obama Seeks Bigger Role for Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES, July
2, 2008, at Al. Although Professor Martha Minow, who reportedly advised the
Obama campaign on this issue, suggested that "there's [nothing] too controversial" about this restriction, this surely understates the extent to which any such
limitations are at least open to debate. See Peter Steinfels, In Wooing the Religious, Obama Hits 6-Word Snag, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2008, at B5 (noting disagreement on the question of whether government can restrict faith-based hiring
by religious beneficiaries of federal social services funds); Zeleny & Luo, supra
note 277, at Al, A14.
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It is not enough, however, to say that "[i]t is doubtful that
children reciting the Pledge of Allegiance feel oppressed or brainGod.' 278
washed as a consequence of muttering the phrase 'under
Whether or not those who are personally offended by such policies
should retain a "sense of proportion" about these policies as private
indviduals, those who are actually charged with "polic[ing] the
boundaries between church and state" are in a different position.279
Indeed, in a regime of genuine inclusion and engagement, it may
be that a firm maintenance of the church-state boundary with respect to official government speech, however minor, is both the
cost and the consequence of allowing vigorous religious speech in
the public and political arena. Just as religious individuals should
not be forced to couch their public arguments in "publicly accessible" terms, so it is possible that government itself, when acting
officially, must leave such issues up for grabs and cannot itself
couch its own statements in explicitly religious terms.
There is thus a good deal in Obama's remarks that merits
critical reflection and not just praise. The speech itself is a model
of engagement between religion and politics. By its very language
and the themes it addresses, it contemplates a world in which religious language and religious arguments are fully welcomed in the
public square. The speech demonstrates that, contrary to those
who have worried that even attempting to voice religious arguments in public debate' ' 2 will either be intolerably divisive"' ° or a
"conversation-stopper, 1 it is possible to have a discussion about
religion and politics that is rich, detailed, and even controversial
without becoming uncivil. Religion need not pay for its entry into
the public square with the coin of blandness offered up by Romney. At the same time, Obama's insistence on a rule of "translation," and the "sense of proportion" he suggests should animate
religious believers who enter the public square, suggests that his
model is incomplete and unsatisfactory. It offers and exemplifies a
policy of engagement; but it falls short of a true policy of inclusion.

278.
279.
280.
siveness"
281.

Obama, supra note 172.
Id.
See Garnett, supra note 16 (discussing and critiquing the use of "diviin Establishment Clause doctrine).
RORTY, supra note 262.
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V. CONCLUSION

For all the surface continuity in the debates over religion
and politics from Kennedy's age to the present, something important has changed. Religion has increasingly become a contested
and contestable concept in our society. That is not to say its star
has dimmed; indeed, it glows far more hotly and brightly than it
did when Kennedy spoke in Houston. Neither religion in general,
however, nor any single faith or faith tradition, are now assumed to
be the only star in the firmament. Even those who hold ever more
fervently to their faith, and to the belief that faith plays a vital and
inescapable role in American political and public life, do so precisely in part because that very belief has become contestable. The
themes may not have changed; one can readily understand Kennedy, Romney, and Obama as speaking in the same language about
the same issues. The fact that they are speaking the same language,
however, should not obscure the fact that the nature of the conversation-what others assume, what others accept, and what others
question-has changed.
Precisely because religion and politics exist today in an age
of contestability, it is important to turn to political speakers like
Kennedy, Romney, and Obama for insight, and not just to the
many thoughtful academic voices on this issue. To be sure, the
speeches examined in this Article may be imperfect in part because
each speaker delivered his respective speech in the public arena
rather than the seminar room. But this could in fact be a virtue.
Kennedy, Romney, and Obama did not have the luxury of nuance,
but neither did they have the freedom to treat the question of
religion's relationship with politics as a philosophical abstraction.
Their speeches took place where religion and politics actually
interact: in the messy, contingent, and sometimes uncivil world of
public debate. Since that is where any resolution of the conflict
between religion and politics must actually occur, it may be especially worthwhile to consider how politicians, the masters of the art
of the possible and practical, would resolve it.
In that light, and in keeping with the combination of stability and change seen in the march of time from Kennedy's age to
today, one might understand all three of these speeches, taken together, as reflecting both stability and change. All three candidates
take on the same basic issue of how religious candidates and voters
should act in a religiously pluralistic democracy. At the same
time, there has been a change in how they would resolve this issue.
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The tune has changed from a strategy of avoidance to a gradually
increasing strategy of public inclusion of religion, in Romney's
case, and public engagement with religion, in Obama's case.
The next step, and the best one, is one of both inclusion and
engagement. It is one in which, contrary to Kennedy, one need not
privatize one's religion in order to enter the public square. It is one
in which, contrary to Obama, one need not couch one's religious
arguments in publicly accessible language in order to participate in
public debate. Finally, contrary to Romney, it is one of genuine
engagement, which is ultimately the truest expression of respect
for religion. One need not admit religion into the public square at
the cost of rendering it banal, or insist that any difficult and unpleasant questions about religion are out-of-bounds. Rather, once
citizens conclude that religion is, or at least can be, of fundamental
importance in public debate and decision-making, they must accept
that religion, like any other issue or motivation, can be the subject
of public debate, criticism, and even derision.
That does not mean Americans must ask such questions, let
alone ask them in a hot-tempered manner. Rather, conversations
about religion and politics should be just that--conversations.282
As Kennedy argued, and as his very willingness to answer questions from a hostile audience in Houston suggested, these conversations should be a genuine dialogue rather than an arbitrary granting or withholding of support on religious grounds. Americans
should not treat these conversations as taboo, however, as Kennedy
and Romney suggest, or be forced to adopt a strictly secular voice,
as Obama proposes.
This model of inclusion and engagement is in some ways
the most difficult of the alternatives. It may lead to greater open
divisiveness would than either a strategy of avoidance or a partial
strategy of inclusion or engagement. But it will also lead to the
best, most meaningful, and most honest dialogue.23 Public discussion at the intersection of religion and politics "will be less anodyne but also less antiseptic" than it is now.2 4 In the end, the model of engagement and inclusion is the only truly authentic, respectful, and fair alternative we have.
282.
257.
283.
284.

For more on the conversational model, see DeGirolami, supra note
See Horwitz, supra note 4, at 146.
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